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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
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qualifications and potential satisfaction of any status or responsibility criteria."' Although a former school administrator's refusal to accept an inferior teaching position in the same school system will not
constitute a wrongful failure to reduce damages,3' the Fourth Circuit
failed to apply any objective criteria in assessing the reasonableness
of Williams' refusal of alternative employment.
PAMELA J. WHITE

VII.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

A. Defendant's Waiver of Right to be Present at Commencement of Trial
A serious problem in the prompt adjudication of criminal cases is
the failure of the defendant to appear at trial.' The defendant's pres2
ence at trial has long been viewed in terms of a right to be present.
This right is supported by two rationales: the defendant must have
the opportunity to observe the proceedings in order to maintain pub10The court concluded that Williams may have felt unqualified to teach after
having been in a solely administrative type of position for several years. 508 F.2d at
1344. The dissenting opinion reached an opposite conclusion after examining Williams'
actual conduct following his demotion, wherein he accepted lower-paying college
teaching positions at a distant location. The dissent compared such employment with
the position offered by Albemarle and determined that Williams did unreasonably
refuse the alternative employment. Id. at 1344-45 (Bryan, J., dissenting).
31Cases dealing with the calculation of damages after reasonable efforts of mitigation upon wrongful discharge include: Jackson v. Wheatley School Dist., 464 F.2d 411
(8th Cir. 1972); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 447 F.2d 1078 (8th Cir. 1971); Rolfe
v. County Bd. of Educ., 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968); Florence Printing Co. v. NLRB,
376 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1967).
P. WicE,
2

FREEDOM FOR SALE

65 (1974).

See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934), overruled on other

grounds, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) ("[T]he defendant has the privilege...
to be present in his own person whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably
substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge." Snyder,
supra, at 105-06); United States v. Lockwood, 382 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). The
constitutional basis of the right of presence is usually found in the sixth amendment.
Snyder v. Massachusetts, supra, (in the right to confront witnesses); Valdez v. United
States, 244 U.S. 432 (1917) (in the right to have assistance of counsel); Diaz v. United
States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912); Walker v. United States, 322 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 976 (1964) (in the right to a public trial). The fifth amendment's
due process clause has also been stated to be a constitutional basis for the presence
right. United States v. Johnson, 129 F.2d 954 (3d Cir. 1942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 189 (1943).
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lic confidence in the trial system as a generator of justice; and the
defendant must be allowed to participate in his own defense in order
to protect the integrity of the trial.' There is also a concomitant
societal duty upon an accused to be present at his trial.' Reasons for
5
this duty include the saving of governmental time and expense, if the
defendant is present, and the retention of control of the criminal
proceeding in the court itself.' The right and the duty of the defendant to be present must be weighed before a trial proceeds in a defen7
dant's absence. The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Peterson was
presented with the issue of whether a federal district court had jurisdiction over a criminal defendant who had voluntarily absented himself at the commencement' of a multiple-defendant trial.
In 1973 the six defendants were apprehended and charged with
bank robbery. Before the trial began, one of the defendants, Eric
Smith, forfeited his bail and absconded to avoid prosecution The
United States v. Gregorio, 497 F.2d 1253, 1258-59 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1024 (1974).
1 The Supreme Court in Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 458 (1912), quoted
from Falk v. United States, 15 App. D.C. 446, 460-61 (1899), appeal dismissed, 180
U.S. 636, cert. denied, 181 U.S. 618 (1901):
'The question is one of broad public policy, whether an accused person, placed upon trial for crime and protected by all the safeguards
with which the humanity of our present criminal law sedulously surrounds him, can with impunity defy the processes of that law, paralyze the proceedings of courts and juries and turn them into a solemn
farce, and ultimately compel society, for its own safety, to restrict the
operation of the principle of personal liberty.'
Smith v. United States, 357 F.2d 486, 490 (5th Cir. 1966).
6 Cureton v. United States, 396 F.2d 671, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
No. 73-2086 (4th Cir. Aug. 19, 1975). Compare Peterson with Kivette v. United
States, 230 F.2d 749, 755 (5th Cir. 1956)("The requirement that an accused present
himself for trial is one of the earliest established in the criminal law" (footnote
omitted)) and Souther v. Reid, 101 F. Supp. 806, 807 (E.D. Va. 1951) and United
States v. Loughrey, 26 F. Cas. 998 (No. 15,631) (E.D.N.Y. 1876).
Appellant Smith had based his presence theory on Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574,
579 (1884) in which the Supreme Court stated: "For every purpose, therefore, involved
in the requirement that the defendant shall be personally present at the trial, where
the indictment is for a felony, the trial commences at least from the time when the
work of empanelling the jury begins." The Fourth Circuit declared that its disposition
of the issue rendered a determination of precisely when a trial begins to be irrelevant.
No. 73-2086 at 39 n.29. But the court's express holding was that "a defendant may
waive his right to be present at the commencement of his trial just as effectively as he
can waive his right to be present at later stages of the proceedings." Id. at 45 (footnote
omitted). See text accompanying notes 30-34 infra for the method by which Tortora
v. United States, 464 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972), the case
chiefly relied upon by the Peterson court, treated the presence issue.
' See notes 33 and 49 infra.
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trial proceeded in his absence; he was convicted'" along with the
others. Four of the convicted defendants appealed in Peterson." Appellant Smith claimed that Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure" requires the presence of a defendant at the beginning of
the trial 3 and that his absence therefore rendered his conviction invalid.
Rejecting Smith's argument, the Fourth Circuit construed Rule 43
as being a "crystallization' '1 4 of the Supreme Court decisions in Lewis
v. United States'" and Diaz v. United States.'" Both decisions dealt
with the defendant's right or privilege to be present at his own trial."
In Lewis, the record'8 failed to reveal the prisoner's presence when
,0 Defendants were convicted of conspiracy to commit bank robbery in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970) (the so-called "general conspiracy statute") and of bank
robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1970).
" Only appellant Smith's appeal involved the issue of an absent defendant at the
start of trial.
" FED. R. CRIM. P. 43 provides in pertinent part:
The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of
the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the
verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by these rules. In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by
death, the defendant's voluntary absence after the trial has been
commenced in his presence shall not prevent continuing the trial to
and including the return of the verdict ....
(emphasis supplied). See generally 8A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 43.01 et seq. (2d
ed. 1975). The amendment to Rule 43, made effective December 1, 1975 by the FEDERAL
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AMENDMENTS Acr OF 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-64, 89 Stat.
370, continues to refer to "a defendant, initially present." FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE-EFFECrIVE DATE, Pub. L. No. 93-361.88 Stat. 397; see 62 F.R.D. 271 (1974)
for text, illustrating that the amendment does not resolve the confusion.
13 See note 8 supra.
11No. 73-2086 at 41, quoting United States v. Gregorio, 497 F.2d 1253, 1257 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1024 (1974). See also Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S.
17, 18-19 (1973); United States v. Moore, 466 F.2d 547, 548 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1111 (1973).
Is 146 U.S. 370 (1892). See also, e.g., United States v. Neal, 320 F.2d 533, 535 (3d
Cir. 1963); Crowe v. United States, 200 F.2d 526, 528 (6th Cir. 1952).
" 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
'7 Lewis and Diaz both relied partially on Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884). See
note 8 supra. When the defendant in Glouser v. United States, 296 F.2d 853 (8th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 825 (1962), attempted to use Hopt as supportive, the court

remarked that it was inapposite because in Hopt a territorial statute compelled the
defendant's personal presence at trial. Id. at 856 n.3.
1"The Lewis court cited Hooker v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 291 (1855),
as requiring the noting of the accused's presence on the record. See also Jones v. United
States, 299 F.2d 661, 662 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 864 (1962).
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peremptory challenges were made to the veniremen,' thus requiring
the reversal of Lewis's conviction. The Lewis Court held that "nothing shall be done in the absence of the prisoner""° after the indictment
has issued. The Court further held that the accused or his counsel did
not have the power to waive the privilege of being personally present
2
at trial .
By contrast, the defendant in Diaz, though present at the start of
trial, later waived his right of presence in writing. The local law
involved in Diaz made the defendant's presence mandatory at arraignment and when judgment was pronounced, but merely entitled
him to be present at other stages of the proceedings. 22 Thus the Diaz
Court, relaxing the Lewis rule,2 held that a defendant's voluntary
absence after the trial's commencement acted as a waiver of his right
24
of presence.
The Fourth Circuit in Peterson held that Lewis and Diaz did not
preclude interpreting Rule 43 to allow an accused's voluntary absence
at the beginning of his trial to operate as a waiver of his presence
right.2 5 The Fourth Circuit then weighed the defendant's right to be
present26 against the governmental interest in orderly justice.2 The
court determined that the governmental interest must prevail. Accordingly, the court reasoned that a defendant who unjustifiably absconds prior to trial should have no greater ability to interfere with
11See United States v. Chrisco, 493 F.2d 232, 236 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
847 (1974).
2 146 U.S. at 372.
2t Id.
2 223 U.S. at 454.
The Supreme Court in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342 (1970) noted that Diaz
had expressly rejected the "broad dicta" of Hopt and Lewis that a trial could not
continue in the defendant's absence. See note 12 supra. Furthermore, the development
of the doctrine of waiver of constitutional rights may well have undermined Lewis. See
note 31 infra.
24 The Diaz Court, in recognizing the defendant's privilege of waiver, relied upon
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), where testimony given in a first trial
was admissible in a second trial over objection because the acctsed had wrongfully
secured the absence of the witness. The Reynolds Court provided an antidote for the
abuses of the sixth amendment's right of confrontation by estopping a defendant from
complainirtg when evidence was admitted to fill the void left by his wrongful act. The
Court stated: "The Constitution does not guarantee an accused person against the
legitimate consequences of his own wrongful acts." Id, at 158. If, as in Reynolds, a
defendant's wrongful obtaining of a witness' absence worked such a result, logic dictates that the same result would occur when a defendant wrongfully absents himself.
13No. 73-2086 at 43.
26 See

2

text accompanying notes 2 and 3 supra.

See text accompanying notes 4-6 supra.
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the trial than a defendant who leaves after the trial begins.2
The Fourth Circuit's holding 9 is consistent with decisions in other
circuits. The Second Circuit in Tortorav. United States," a multipledefendant trial, found that a deliberate failure to appear in court for
trial can be considered a "knowing" waiver of the right to be present.' A defendant, the court held, has an obligation to appear in
court, and his failure to do so evinces an "intention to obstruct the
orderly processes of justice. 32 However, before a trial can proceed
without the defendant, the judge must find that the defendant had
adequate notice of the time and place of trial, and this cannot be done
until the defendant answers an indictment in open court.3 3 Therefore,
the record must show that the defendant knew when the proceedings
were to begin and yet neglected to appear. The defendant has then
1

No. 73-2086 at 44-45.
Compare Parker v. United States, 184 F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1950) with United
States v. White, 237 F. Supp. 644 (E.D. Va. 1964), aff'd, 342 F.2d 379 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 871 (1965) and Near v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1963).
- 464 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
3,A waiver is generally the intentional abandonment of a known right or privilege.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). The right of presence, like any other
constitutional guarantee, may be waived by the defendant. Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934), overruled on other grounds, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964). Such waiver may be implied from the defendant's conduct. Illinois v. Allen,
397 U.S. 337 (1970).
The Tortora court, 464 F.2d at 1208, noting that waiver of the right to be present
prior to the impanelment of the jury had been previously found in but one case, State
v. Tacon, 107 Ariz. 353, 488 P.2d 973 (1971), cert. granted, 407 U.S. 909 (1972), cert.
dismissed as improvidently granted,410 U.S. 351 (1973), held that there was no reason
to wait until impanelment to find waiver.
2 464 F.2d at 1208.
Id. at 1209. In Peterson, Smith and his attorney had been at the arraignment
when Smith had pleaded not guilty and had been told that trial was set for May 1,
1973 and that his bond, expressly noting this date and that of the pretrial hearing, was
conditioned upon his attendance at both proceedings. No. 73-2086 at 39 n.30. Thus
Smith knew of the time for the trial's commencement, and waiver could be implied
from his conduct because he offered no reason for his absence. See note 31 supra. But
besides being voluntary, a waiver must also be intelligent. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464 (1938). If intelligence in waiving constitutional rights requires the same knowledge necessary to plead guilty or nolo contendere-"with understanding of the nature
. . .and the consequences"-under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a prophylactic rule regarding waivers might be analogized from that Rule. This
rule would require the judge at arraignment or some other pretrial proceeding to advise
the defendant that his absence at the start of trial waives his right of presence and
that trial may proceed without him and that, further, his complete absence will not
prevent conviction. See State v. Davis, 108 Ariz. 335, 498 P.2d 202, 204 (1972); State
v. Tacon, 107 Ariz. 353, 488 P.2d 973, 976-77 (1971), cert. granted,407 U.S. 909 (1972),
cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 410 U.S. 351 (1973).
29
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had, according to the Second Circuit, the opportunity to be present
at his trial in accordance with Rule 43.34
Relying partially on Tortora, the Third Circuit in a singledefendant trial, Virgin Islands v. Brown,35 held that the opportunity
to be present had been afforded to a defendant who was free on bail
conditioned on his appearance at trial.3 6 The defendant had failed to
arrive for a morning's voir dire examination, but did arrive that afternoon.3 The Brown court, in affirming the conviction, observed that
there were no "talismanic properties which differentiate the commencement of a trial from later stages."38 Brown's holding was
broader than the holding in Tortora because the effects of the latter's
holding were intended to be applicable chiefly to multiple-defendant
trials, 39 while Brown involved a single defendant. The Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Peterson, consistent with Brown and Tortora, adhered to the waiver doctrine where multiple defendants were involved.
Tortora, Brown and now Peterson illuminate the governmental
interest in having a defendant present at his trial. That presence
prevents the delay of criminal trials which public interest demands
be completed expediently. 0 Also, the government's case may become
prejudiced as time passes and the memories of witnesses fade in
clarity and credibility.4 Furthermore, government witnesses may be
464 F.2d at 1209.
.507 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1975). Noting that the decision to proceed with a trial in
the absence of a defendant is within the trial judge's discretion, the Tortora court
remarked that "lilt
is difficult for us to conceive of any case where the exercise of
this discretion would be appropriate other than a multiple-defendant case." 464 F.2d
at 1210 n.7. See Campbell v. United States, 295 A.2d 498, 502-03 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972).
The Tortora court recognized the difficulty of rescheduling a multiple-defendant trial,
the likelihood of overlapping evidence in two trials, especially where one concerned
multiple defendants, and the jeopardy in which government witnesses may be kept
throughout two trials. 464 F.2d at 1210; see note 42 infra.
5'See note 33 supra.
3 The defendant in Brown apparently arrived late to trial of his own volition, in
contrast to the defendants in Tortora and Peterson who were arrested again after their
convictions. 464 F.2d at 1206 n.3; see text accompanying note 10 supra.
11507 F.2d at 189. The "commencement" of the trial in Brown was before the voir
dire examination. See note 8 supra.
39See note 35 supra.
11See 464 F.2d at 1208-09; cf. the qualification of the Campbell court: "[Tihe
public interest is not limited merely to 'keeping the trial calendar moving.'" 295 A.2d
at 503 n.3.
1 464 F.2d at 1209. Delay can also prejudice the defendant's case. For example,
his witnesses' memories may fade. However, the prosecution must go forward with the
evidence, and it has the burden of persuasion on the guilt issue. 1 F. WHARTON, CRIMI-
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threatened during the pendency of a trial,42 or they may prove recalcitrant and attempt or obtain escape, as did the government's chief
witness in Peterson.3 Finally, they may simply die or leave the juris44
diction of the court.
A further justification for a waiver of the presence right is that the
traditional remedies for the prejudice to the government's case result5
ing from a defendant's voluntary absence are relatively ineffectual.1
46
47
The court's contempt power may be utilized. But the contempt
power merely threatens another prosecution in addition to the one
NAL EVIDENCE

§ 13 (13th ed. 1972). Therefore, delay may affect the prosecution's case
more than the defendant's because a defendant may produce no evidence and still be
acquitted. See, e.g., United States v. Lake, 482 F.2d 146, 148 (9th Cir. 1973). Further,
absent justifiable continuances sought by the prosecution, a defendant can thwart
prosecutorial delay by demanding his right to a speedy trial. U.S. CONST. amend. VI;
see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). See also Carter, The States'Attorney:A View
From the Bench in 1 PLI, THE PROSECUTOR'S SOURCEBOOK 13, 17 (B. George & I. Cohen
ed. 1969): "Undue [prosecutorial] delay not only violates the constitutional rights of
the accused to a speedy trial, but often seriously interferes with the effective prosecution of the case."
42 Witnesses were threatened in Tortora. 464 F.2d at 1205.
" No. 73-2086 at 48-49. Another witness-related problem was illustrated in
Peterson when most of the twenty government witnesses who were gathered were to
present vital identification testimony, which of course was weakened by the absence
of one of the defendants.
Regarding the requirement of the prisoner's presence at trial for identification
purposes, see, e.g., United States v. Moore, 466 F.2d 547 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1111 (1973); Kivette v. United States, 230 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1956).
" See C. McCORMIcK, EVIDNCE § 253 (2d ed. 1972).
The problems of preventive detention are discussed in Note, The Costs of Preventive Detention, 79 YALE L.J. 926 (1970) and Note, ConstitutionalLimitations on
the Conditions of PretrialDetention, 79 YALE L.J. 941 (1970).
" See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970) which allows a United States court discretion regarding penalties for obstruction of justice or disobedience to a court's rule or command.
Id. § 402. The Supreme Court in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 345 (1970), recognized
the shortcomings of the contempt remedy: "[Tihe defendant might not be affected
by a mere contempt sentence when he ultimately faces a far more serious sanction...
[iut must be recognized . . . that a defendant might conceivably, as a matter of
calculated strategy, elect to spend a prolonged period in confinement for contempt in
the hope that adverse witnesses might be unavailable after a lapse of time. A court
must guard against allowing a defendant to profit from his own wrong in this way."
Of course, the defendant who remains absent avoids the effect of a contempt charge.
See Foote, Compelling Appearance In Court: Administration Of Bail In Philadelphia,
102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1068 & n.139 (1954).
" The court in Campbell v. United States, 295 A.2d 498, 500 n.8 (D.C. Ct. App.
1972), suggested that the contempt power may be the only weapon available to a court
which is otherwise "helpless when a defendant does not appear at the beginning of the
trial as directed."

"
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already stalled, and does nothing to further the latter prosecution or
to secure the presence of the defendant.48
Prosecution for bail-jumping" entails similar shortcomings; such
a prosecution does not "vindicate the public interest . . .[in a]
speedy disposition of the criminal charges."" Additionally, there is
in practice virtually "no chance" of recapturing a defendant who has
forfeited bail intentionally unless he is arrested for the commission
of an additional offense.5" Thus, the defendant remains a fugitive for
the original crime and for the crime of bail-jumping, or contempt.
By allowing the trial to begin in the defendant's absence, the court
has provided a remedy for that absence which is more likely to encourage presence than either a contempt citation or a bail-jumping
indictment.- Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit's holding in Peterson
that the trial may commence in the defendant's absence once the
court has ascertained that the defendant had the opportunity to be
present may facilitate orderly criminal justice.
,' See note 46 supra.
"18 U.S.C. § 3150 (1970) provides for a fine of not more than $5000 or a prison
term of not more than five years, or both, for an absconded felony suspect who has
"jumped bail." See United States v. Garcia-Turino, 458 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 951 (1972). Falk v. United States, 15 App. D.C. 446, 454-55 (1899),
appeal dismissed, 180 U.S. 636, cert. denied, 181 U.S. 618 (1901), illustrates that,
before presence was held to be waivable, bail was considered the means to secure a
defendant's appearance:
It does not seem to us to be consonant with the dictates of common sense that an accused person, being at large upon bail, should
be at liberty, whenever he pleased, to withdraw himself from the
courts of his country and to break up a trial already commenced. The
practical result of such a proposition, if allowed to be law, would be
to prevent any trial whatever until the accused person himself should
be pleased to permit it. . . .This would be a travesty of justice which
could not be tolerated; and it is not required or justified by any regard
for the right of personal liberty.
Id. Therefore, waiver of the presence right encourages, as does bail forfeiture, a defendant's presence at trial. When a defendant voluntarily absents himself before the start
of trial, the trial, in the judge's discretion, may proceed without him. Also, he would
forfeit his posted bail.
- Tortora v. United States, 464 F.2d at 1209. See note 40 and accompanying text
supra.
1' P. WicE, FREEDOM FOR SALE 68 (1974). In Philadelphia, for example, there are
over 6000 unserved bench warrants; the explanation for the failure to locate the
absconded defendants is that the agencies trying to serve the warrants are ignorant of
the defendants' whereabouts and have inadequate staff to locate them. Id.
512
One commentator suggests:
When one closely examines the current operations of our court systems, it can be seen that merely adding on an additional penalty
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B. Failure to Apprise Defendant of 1970 Drug Act's Special Parole Term-Harmless Error if Defendant Not Misled
Since Kercheval v. United States,53 the Supreme Court has recognized the importance of a defendant's understanding of the consequences of his guilty plea.54 By pleading guilty a defendant waives his
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, 55 his right to a trial
by jury,5 and the right to confront his accusers.17 A valid waiver of
these rights by the defendant must be both voluntary and intelligent. 8 Therefore, the defendant must know the direct consequences
of his guilty plea, such as the length of the prison sentence he could
receive."
would have little effect. With our criminal justice system plagued by
a tremendous backlog of cases and all court officials devoted to the
important task of moving these cases through this assembly-line process, the plea-bargaining system has developed as the only feasible
solution to the current dilemma. The addition of one count of bail
forfeiture to the already existing plethora of charges against the defendant, who is manipulating to have a reduced charge and light sentence
in return for a guilty plea, is insignificant at best. All such charges, it
should be remembered, are usually permitted to run concurrently.
Id. at 70 (1974); see United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1204 n.1 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
274 U.S. 220 (1927).
51274 U.S. at 223. See generally Erickson, The Finality of a Plea of Guilty, 48
NoTaE DAE LAw. 835 (1973). See also Wade v. Coiner, 468 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1972);
Pilkington v. United States, 315 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1963).
The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part:
No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself ....
U.S. CONST. amend V.

The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed ...

to be confronted

with the witnesses against him ....
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

51Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969); see also Parker v. North Carolina,
397 U.S. 790, 800-01 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). See generally
Comment, The Guilty PleaAs A Waiver Of Rights And As An Admission Of Guilt, 44
TFip. L.Q. 540 (1971).
51 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); McCarthy v. United States,
394 U.S. 459, 465 & n.11 (1969). See generally Davis, The Guilty PleaProcess: Exploring The Issues Of Voluntariness And Accuracy, 6 VAL. U.L.R. 111 (1972).
59 The direct consequences of a guilty plea are generally considered to be the
sentencing consequences of the plea which, together with the nature of the charges,
comprise those elements which the defendant must "understand" in order to make an

526

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXI

Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, " the
judge at arraignment is responsible for ascertaining whether the accused understands that these rights have been waived, and whether
the defendant is aware of the direct consequences of his guilty plea.
The Fourth Circuit in Bell v. United States"'confronted the issue of
whether a defendant's ignorance, at arraignment, of a statutorily
2
required special parole term rendered his guilty plea invalid.
intelligent plea. D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION 206 (1966). See also Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970); A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING To PLEAS OF GUILTY § 1.4 (Approved Draft 1968). This
apprisal of the plea consequences has usually included only the maximum possible
sentence the accused may receive. NEWMAN, supra at 208. But this standard has been
broadened to include such determinants upon the length of sentence as the defendant's
ineligibility for parole. See, e.g., Moody v. United States, 469 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1972).
Further, the actual consequences of a guilty plea, which can include the loss of voting
rights, employment opportunities, and certain property rights, are numerous and complex. See Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23
VAND. L. REV. 929 (1970). Such consequences are collateral to the guilty plea and do
not have to be conveyed to the defendant. See Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461,
465 n.4 (2d Cir. 1974).
FED. R. CrIM. P. 11 provides in pertinent part:
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept
such plea . . . without first addressing the defendant personally and
determining that the plea is made voluntarily with the understanding
of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.
The Supreme Court's principal decision concerning Rule 11 is McCarthy v. United
States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), where the Court held that "a defendant is entitled to plead
anew if a United States district court accepts his guilty plea without fully adhering to
the procedure provided for in Rule 11 . . . [because] any noncompliance with Rule
11 is reversible error .... " Id. at 463-64 & n.9 (emphasis supplied). Further, "if a
defendant's guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in
violation of due process and is therefore void." Id. at 466 (footnote omitted). Chief
Justice Warren, writing for the majority in McCarthy, explained that the Rule's procedure was not constitutionally mandated but that it did serve to aid the judge in
ascertaining whether a defendant's guilty plea is truly voluntary. Also, the Rule is
intended to ensure a complete record of the plea-accepting process, thus erecting a
procedure which discourages the myriad of "often frivolous post-conviction attacks on
the constitutional validity of guilty pleas." Id. at 465 (footnote omitted).
The mandatory language of McCarthy concerning reversible error has been modified by later circuit decisions such as United States v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 516 (8th
Cir. 1973) (trial judge need not impart consequences but only ascertain that defendant
is aware of them), but implicitly reaffirmed in such decisions as United States v.
Wolak, 510 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1975) and Roberts v. United States, -491 F.2d 1236 (3d
Cir. 1974). See also Note, The Trial Judge's Satisfaction as to Voluntariness and
Understandingof Guilty Pleas, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 289.
I 521 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1975).
62 The Fourth Circuit's opinion is unclear as to whether ignorance of the parole
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In Bell, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the convictions of two defendants 3 who had pleaded guilty to distributing heroin in violation of
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.1
The Act requires, in addition to an ordinary sentence, a special parole
term 5 of three years for a first offender and six years for a repeat
offender.66 The defendants challenged their convictions on the ground
that they had not been advised at arraignment of the special parole
terms, and that they therefore did not understand the consequences
term is relevant to the voluntariness or the intelligence of the plea. But the term is a
consequence of the plea. See text accompanying note 68 infra. Thus, failure to mention
it deprives the defendant of necessary knowledge, and therefore relates to the intelligence of the plea.
'3 The cases, one arising in South Carolina, the other in Maryland, were consolidated on appeal.
1121 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. (1970).
Is Polley statement, Bureau of Prisons, 7500.43, January 18, 1973, quoted in Roberts v. United States, 491 F.2d 1236, 1238 (3d Cir. 1974), explains the special parole
term:
The SPT [Special Parole Term] is separate from and begins after the
usual sentence terminates, including any period of supervision. In the
event an individual should violate during the period of supervision
prior to the beginning of the SPT, he will be returned as a violator of
the basic period of supervision with the SPT still to follow unaffected.
When an individual is released from confinement by any of the following methods, the SPT will begin as indicated:
(1) Mandatory release-SPT begins at the termination
of supervision.
(2) Parole-SPT begins at full term date.
(3) Sentence expiration (Exp-GT (expiration with
extra good time), Exp-FT (expiration with full time) and
Min-Exp (minimum expiration)). SPT begins with release
from confinement.
[The Roberts court continued:] Thus it can be readily seen that
SPT significantly differs from ordinary concepts of parole. SPT imposes restrictions upon freedom in excess of the full term of sentence
and the possibility of additional imprisonment for SPT violation.
Id. (footnote omitted).
" Section 841 of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1970), provides that a special
parole term "of at least 3 years" be imposed upon a first offender in addition to his
term of imprisonment; for a recidivist the special parole term is "at least 6 years". Id.
Subsection (c) provides that upon violation of the special parole term, the violator is
reincarcerated for the period of the special parole term, and any time spent on special
parole prior to the violation is not credited to the resultant new term. A special parolee
whose parole has been revoked may be compelled to serve all or part of the remainder
of the new prison term. The statute further states that a special parole term is in
addition to and not instead of conventional parole. Id. (c).
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of their pleas as mandated by Rule 11.11 The Fourth Circuit held that
although the district court should have informed the defendants of
the mandatory special parole term, 8 the failure to do so in Bell was
harmless error because the sentences imposed upon the defendants,
when added to the special parole terms, did not exceed the maximum
sentences described by the judge at arraignment."
The harmless error rationale in Bell departed substantially from
prior decisions in the Eighth 0 and Third Circuits.7' Those circuits
announced the rule that the special parole term was a consequence
of the guilty plea and a failure by the district judge to explain thatconsequence at arraignment constituted reversible error per se. In a
recent application of this per se rule, the Sixth Circuit, in United
States v. Wolak,72 extended the doctrine to a situation wherein the
judge mentioned the special parole term to the defendant but had not
explained its mandatory nature, 73 even after the defendant had expressed his lack of understanding. Although mention of the special
parole term arguably alerted the defendant to the possible plea conse75
quences," the Wolak decision strengthened the per se rule. The
"7See note

60 supra.
" The special parole term has been held specifically to be a consequence of a
guilty plea. United States v. Wolak, 510 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1975); Roberts v. United
States, 491 F.2d 1236 (3d Cir. 1974); and United States v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 516
(8th Cir. 1973). See also Garcia v. United States, 492 F.2d 395, 398 (10th Cir.) cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974) (defendant's contention of ignorance of the special parole
term unsupported by the record).
" Bell was told that the maximum possible sentence he could receive was fifteen
years. He received six years, which sentence was later augmented by the three-year
special parole term. Defendant Sampson was advised likewise. He received a ten-year
sentence, which was subsequently reduced to eight years but with three years on
special parole.
ToUnited States v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 516 (8th Cir. 1973).
7' Roberts v. United States, 491 F.2d 1236 (3d Cir. 1974).
72 510 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1975). Wolak was not mentioned by the Bell court.
13 See note 66 supra.
7, The Eighth Circuit in Richardson declared that the defendant's understanding
of the consequences of his guilty plea did not necessarily have to issue from the judge,
but that it was the judge's duty to ascertain that the defendant was apprised of such
consequences. 483 F.2d at 159; see text accompanying note 60 supra. Cf. Eagle Thunder v. United States, 477 F.2d 1326 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 873 (1973). See
also McCullough v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Fla. 1964), wherein the court
stated: "Hearings may disclose that this defendant . . . before pleading guilty was
actually aware of the possible penalties under the [statute], having been informed by
his attorney, or by the Probation Officer. . . or by someone else." Id. at 741.
11 See notes 60 and 74 supra.
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Wolak court, by refraining from inquiring whether the defendant
understood the consequences of his plea, firmly placed the duty upon
the district judge to ascertain that the defendant did know of the
special parole term and could thus plead intelligently 6 and voluntarily.
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in Bell imputed misunderstanding
of the plea's consequences to the defendant only if the sentence he
received plus the special parole term exceeded the sentence he was
advised of at the arraignment." If, however, the defendant cannot be
deemed to have been misled, the per se rule is inapplicable, and
harmless error results."8 Thus, the court measured the subjective
quality of the accused's confusion by comparing the sentence possibility he was apprised of at arraignment and the sentence actually
imposed after conviction.
The thrust of Judge Widener's dissent in Bell was that such a
calculation cannot be fairly made. He indicated that determination
of the effect the knowledge of the special parole term has on a defendant's election to plead guilty is impossible. 9 Judge Widener reasoned that an inquiry into the defendant's election is not aided by
arbitrary mathematical formulations."0 Thus, he stated, the opportunity of plea withdrawal was the appropriate remedy.8
The Fourth Circuit had previously rejected the formula adopted
by the Bell majority. In Paige v. United States,8 the defendant had
not been advised that his guilty plea would be treated as a second
11The defendant's pleading in Wolak was further confused because the judge, in
mentioning the special parole term, described it as being "up to three years" when in
fact the minimum term is three years. 510 F.2d at 166.
521 F.2d at 715. The government in Moody v. United States, 469 F.2d 705 (8th
Cir. 1972), had urged just such a calculation in regard to a defendant's not being told

of his ineligibility for parole. In Moody, the government argued that the defendant's
eight-year sentence was less than one-third of the maximum possible sentence of thirty
years and so the defendant, even if he reasonably had expected parole, would have also
expected to serve at least ten years. Thus, the government contended, the sentence he

received was less than the minimum he could have anticipated and so he was not
prejudiced. The Moody court rejected this argument and held that it could not be
determined that "the failure of the court to advise Moody of his parole eligibility did

not in fact serve to mislead him." Id. at 709.
"1521 F.2d at 714.
, See note 77 supra.
521 F.2d at 716.
, See, e.g., United States v. Wolak, 510 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1975); Roberts v.
United States, 491 F.2d 1236 (3d Cir. 1974). In Bell, such an offer had been made to
defendant Sampson. 521 F.2d at 716.
'- 443 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1971).
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narcotics conviction, thus exposing him to a possibly greater sentence
than a first offender and to further consequences such as ineligibility
for parole." Although the sentence Paige actually received was within
the statutory range for a first offense, the Fourth Circuit held that
failure to comply with Rule 111 necessitated rearraignment because
of the impossibility of ascertaining the effect on the defendant's
guilty plea of the court's misleading statement."5
The petitioner in Bell attempted to extend Paige's rejection of a
formulaic treatment regarding ineligibility for parole to the special
parole term present in Bell. The Fourth Circuit rejected Bell's argument by focusing upon the failure of the court in Paigeto advise the
defendant of his ineligibility for parole." The Bell court concluded
that "Paige was probably misled in fact"87 because he could have
reasonably expected to have had the opportunity to earn parole.
However, Bell likewise could have entertained the reasonable expectation of having completely served his sentence once he was released
from prison. 8
A prisoner's ineligibility for parole and the special parole term
both add time to a regular sentence. 8 In regard to ineligibility, time
Id. at 783.
*' See note 60 supra.

443 F.2d at 783. See note 77 and text accompanying note 79 supra.
521 F.2d at 715.
7

Id.

I The sentence would have been "completely" served upon release from prison
had there been no special parole consequences. See text accompanying notes 89-91
infra.
" The plea consequence which has been analogized to special parole in terms of
onus is ineligibility for conventional parole. The Second Circuit in Michel v. United
States, 507 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1974), stated:
In Bye [Bye v. United States, 435 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1970)] we said:
'[Tihe unavailability of parole directly affects the length of time an
accused will have to serve in prison ....

It would seem that such a

major effect on the length of possible incarceration would have great
importance to an accused in considering whether to plead guilty." 435
F.2d at 180. We believe that the special parole here imposed is
comparable ....

Id. at 463 (emphasis supplied).

Further, the Richardson court declared that the application of the consequence
of the special parole term "is governed by" Moody v. United States, 469 F.2d 705 (8th
Cir. 1972), which held that ineligibility for parole was a consequence of a guilty plea
about which the defendant must be informed before his guilty plea was accepted. 483
F.2d at 518.
Regarding ineligibility for parole, contrast Moody, supra, (consequence of guilty
plea) and Otero-Rivera v. United States, 494 F.2d 900 (1st Cir. 1974) (consequence of
guilty plea) with Herrara v. United States, 507 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1975) (not a consequence of guilty plea).
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is added in the sense that a prisoner who is eligible for parole may
have a reasonable chance of receiving it, and such receipt would
deduct time from his full term of sentence; the ineligible prisoner has
no such opportunity. The special parole term may be even more
burdensome that ineligibility for parole because it "imposes restrictions upon freedom in excess of the full term of sentence with the
possibility of additional imprisonment for violation." 90 Thus, once
incarceration ends, the prisoner who has been ineligible for parole is
released, while the Drug Act prisoner, as in Bell, is still subject to at
least three years of special parole beyond his ordinary sentence.'
Accordingly, the special parole term is an extension of the ordinary
sentence. Failure to inform the defendant of this at arraignment
raises the same specter of unintelligent pleading as does failure to
notify a defendant of his ineligibility for parole.
C. Wiretap Subject's Identity, if Known, Required in a Tap Extension Application
Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
196892 authorizes the use of electronic surveillance by federal law
enforcement officers" in the investigation of certain delineated offenses.94 Recognizing the potential abuses of electronic surveillance, 9
" Roberts v. United States, 491 F.2d at 1238. Other courts have observed the
effects of the special parole term: "It is clear to us that addition of the three-year
special parole term made the new sentence more onerous than it was previously."
Caille v. United States, 487 F.2d 614, 616 (5th Cir. 1973). "[T]he special parole term
is a type of restraint that is imposed in addition to the general sentence ... including
any parole therefrom, has been served. Further, a violation of the condition of the
terms of the special parole can result in an enhanced sentence for the length of the
special parole term, which in effect constitutes a second sentence." United States v.
Richardson, 483 F.2d 516, 519 (8th Cir. 1973).
",
The Michel court stated that "special parole adds time to a regular sentence."
507 F.2d at 463 (footnote omitted); accord, United States v. Thomas, 356 F. Supp. 173,
174 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1336 (2d Cir. 1973). See text accompanying note
89 supra.
92 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et. seq. (1970). See generally A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING To ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

(Approved Draft, 1971); Note, Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance-Title III of
the Crime Control Act of 1968, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 319 (1969). The Senate Report
declared that "wiretapping is an indispensable weapon in the fight against organized
crime." S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, repiintedat 1968 2 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2112, 2159 [hereinafter cited as REPORT 1097; CODE].
13 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1970). Certain state officials may also apply to state courts
for a wiretap order pursuant to state statutes. Id. (2).
"Id. (1).
'5 The Senate Report of the Act, commenting upon the unauthorized use of elec-
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Congress erected a mandatory procedure" by which an investigating
officer must apply for a court order before proceeding with the wiretap. 7 The informational requirements for the investigative officer's
application for wiretap approval, and for the judge's order, include
"the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and
whose communications are to be intercepted."98 The requirements for
orders extending the approved period of time of the tap or otherwise
expanding its terms are identical.9 The Fourth Circuit recently considered the validity of wiretap extension orders which failed to identify the tapee, even though his identity had been learned prior to the
application for an extension.'
In United States v. Bernstein, the federal government had probable cause' 0' to believe that Calman Bernstein was implicated in a
gambling operation, thus rendering him subject to a wiretap. After a
third party's telephones had been tapped pursuant to an application
and order in which Berstein was not named, the Government ascertained that Bernstein used one of the telephones to discuss illegal
gambling operations.102 One call definitely implicated Bernstein as
part of the gambling business. The extension application made by the
Government three days later mentioned neither this call nor Bernstein.9 3 Subsequently, Bernstein was indicted for conducting an illetronic eavesdropping by private persons, as opposed to law enforcement officers,
stated:
[Pirivacy of communication is seriously jeopardized by these
[electronic] techniques of surveillance . . . .No longer is it possible
. . .for each man to retreat into his home and be left alone. Every
spoken word relating to each man's personal, marital, religious, political, or commercial concerns can be intercepted by an unseen auditor
and turned against the speaker to the auditor's advantage.
REPORT 1097, supra note 92, at 67; CoDE at 2154. See notes 105 and 135 infra.
9618 U.S.C. § 2518 (1970).
17The court order may issue only after the authorization of the Attorney General
or his specially designated Assistant. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1). See United States v. Chavez,
416 U.S. 562 (1974); United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
11 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv) and (4)(2). The same language appears for the requirements of the application and the order.
99Id. (5)
I"o
United States v. Bernstein, 509 F.2d 996 (4th Cir. 1975), petition filed for cert.,
44 U.S.L.W. 3030 (U.S. May 29, 1975) (No. 74-1486).
"I Probable cause is determined by the judge issuing the order. 18 U.S.C. §
2518(3)(a) (1970). See 509 F.2d at 1002 & n.15.
102 Cf. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 157 (1974).
103 See text accompanying note 99 supra. The court observed that the fact that
Bernstein involved an extension application was insignificant. 509 F.2d at 1000 n.9.
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gal gambling business. At trial, the interceptions after the extension
order were declared unlawful, and therefore the recorded conversations were inadmissible as evidence with respect to Bernstein because
of the failure to identify him. The Government appealed.
The Fourth Circuit held that the Government's failure to name
Bernstein necessitated suppression of the evidence of Bernstein's telephone conversations. 0 Identification, the court held, was a material
element of proceeding with a wiretap because it was vital in protecting "the privacy of wire and oral communications while allowing the
use of electronic surveillance in the investigation of certain crimes."'0 5
The Fourth Circuit began its analysis by a consideration of United
States v. Kahn.'6 There, the Supreme Court held that the iaming
of an individual in the tap application or order is necessary only when
the investigative officers have probable cause to believe that the person is committing the offense for which the tap was sought.' 7 Although the Kahn dictum' 8 indicates that the fourth amendment' 9
might not demand identifying a prospective tapee,110 the Fourth Circuit reasoned that an "identification nevertheless fosters conformity
with constitutional and statutory requirements.""' However, since
Suppression of tap evidence is provided for in 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (1970).
509 F.2d at 999. The Report of Title II stated:
Title II has as its dual purpose (1) protecting the privacy of wire and
oral communications, and (2) delineating on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and
oral communications may be authorized. To assure the privacy of oral
and wire communications, title M prohibits all wiretapping and electronic surveillance by persons other than duly authorized law enforcement officers engaged in the investigation or prevention of specified
types of serious crimes ....
REPORT 1097, supra note 92 at 66; CODE at 2153.
1- 415 U.S. 143 (1974).
' Id.
at 155.
1 Id. at 155 n.15. Analogizing wiretaps to conventional searches and seizures,
which is compelled by the holding in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the
Supreme Court in Kahn stated that "as long as the property to be seized is described
with sufficient specificity, even a warrant failing to name the owner of the premises at
which a search is directed, while not the best practice, has been held to pass muster
under the Fourth Amendment." 415 U.S. at 155 n.15.
IO" U.S. CONST. amend IV. Cf. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974);
"The issue [suppression of illegally-obtained wiretap evidence] does not turn on the
judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights, but upon the provisions of Title III ....
" Id. at 524; United States v.
Bobo, 477 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1973).
220 509 F.2d at 999.
' Id.
"o
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the federal agents had probable cause to suspect Bernstein's involvement in illicit gambling, the Fourth Circuit could have simply relied
upon Kahn's express holding to require naming Bernstein in the extension order.
The Fourth Circuit offered several rationales, in addition to its
reliance on Kahn, to support its decision that failure to identify the
suspect was a material violation of Title 111.112 First, the failure to
identify the individual being tapped indicated that less information
concerning known persons is being conveyed by the agents involved
to the Attorney General who must authorize the tap.13 Since the
agents involved in the case would possess more information about the
prospective tapee than the Attorney General, the Fourth Circuit indicated that the subordinates' judgment regarding the necessity of the
tap compromises an otherwise independent determination by the
Attorney General."'
A related problem concerns the information that the government
must provide to the judge. If the identity of the suspect is known but
is not included in the electronic surveillance history of the persons
named in a particular application," 5 the judge cannot know if the
suspect has been tapped before." 6 Thus, the Fourth Circuit reasoned
that the judicial control which Congress envisioned" 7 is thereby
8
weakened."

The Bernstein court further stated that the function of the judge
in reviewing tap applications was a crucial stage in protecting the
tapee from unnecessary intrusions into his privacy."' Accordingly,
the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the failure to name Bernstein in the
extension application infringed upon his privacy with the result that
he received no statutory notice 21 of the surveillance. Because he had
112The Bernstein court stated that a material violation occurs when the statutory
provision breached was one which Congress had intended to be "a precondition to
obtaining . . . intercept authority." 509 F.2d at 999, quoting United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515 (1974).
" See note 97 supra.
I
509 F.2d at 1000.
"5 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (1970).
11 509 F.2d at 1000; see United States v. Bellosi, 501 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
17 See REPORT 1097, supra note 92 at 89; CODE at 2177.
11

509 F.2d at 1000.

119Id.

120Section 2518, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970), requires that persons named in a
wiretap application or order be notified not later than ninety days after the filing of
an application for an order that the order had been applied for, whether it had been
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no notice, he could not bring a civil action to redress the violation of
his privacy.' 2 Thus, the court's holding in Bernstein focused on the
rights of the tapee.
In contrast, other circuits have narrowly construed the importance of identifying the prospective tapee. The Fifth Circuit, in United
States v. Doolittle,2 2 adopted a construction of Title III which limited
privacy protection. The defendants argued that the Government had
reasonable cause to believe that their telephone conversations would
be overheard, and that they therefore should have been named in the
tap order.12n Since they were not named, the defendants contended
that the tap was illegal. The Fifth Circuit minimized the importance
of a lack of statutory notice and required the defendants to establish
prejudice from the absence of statutory notice of the tap before suppression of the intercepted conversations would be granted. Since the
defendants in Doolittle failed to establish prejudice, the conversations were admitted into evidence. 2 4 In Bernstein, however, the defendant was not required to show prejudice; a failure to identify the
approved, the period of approved interception, and whether such interception had in
fact occurred.
' Section 2520 of Title 111, 18 U.S.C. § 2520-(1970), provides for the recovery of
civil damages, including punitive damages, from any party who intercepts a communication in violation of Title Im. However, the government is afforded some protection
against such suits because a good-faith reliance on a court order or legislative authorization is a complete defense. Id.
" 507 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3530 (U.S.
Oct. 2, 1975) (No. 75-513).
'" That the defendants in Doolittlewere asserting that the government had probable cause to suspect their involvement in the illegal gambling operations controlled by
Doolittle is revealed by the court's statement that the government possessed "personal
knowledge, as opposed to information, to support probable cause" only with respect
to Doolittle himself. 507 F.2d at 1371. Also, certain other of the Doolittle defendants
asserted that the government lacked probable cause to believe that their speech would
be intercepted. Id. Significantly, however, the Doolittle court stated that Title III does
not require probable cause as to all tapees. Id. However, since § 2518(1)(b), 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(1)(b) (1970), requires a full statement of the facts and circumstances relied
upon to justify the tap request, probable cause seems to be required as to all tapees.
Cf. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967). Thus, the court's determination that
the failure to name the two Doolittle defendants was not erroneous is questionable,
making possible comparison of their situation and Bernstein's. Cf. United States v.
Chiarizio, 388 F. Supp. 858, 872 (D. Conn. 1975).
"I The Doolittle court's finding was apparently based on the facts that the defendants later received an inventory of the tapes, were allowed to hear them and were
provided transcripts of the conversations to be used against them at trial. 507 F.2d at
1371; see 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970). Thus, the defendants received actual notice
of the wiretaps, albeit not statutory notice.
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tapee sufficed to compel suppression of the tapped conversations.I
The Sixth Circuit adopted a less restrictive approach to tapee
identification in United States v. O'Neill.2 1 In O'Neill, the appellant
was not named in the original tap application. 2 7 The order was
amended once, and O'Neill was still not named although by the time
of the amendment he had been identified. Subsequently, O'Neill was
named in a new application, his identity and involvement in the
interstate transmission of wagering information having been adduced
from conversations overheard pursuant to the original order. O'Neill
challenged the admission of the wiretap evidence on the ground that
he should have been named in the first amending order. The Sixth
Circuit held that the requirement for amending the eavesdropping
order did not demand the identification of a previously unnamed
28
suspect.
Unlike the Sixth Circuit in O'Neill, which focused upon the extension order, the Fourth Circuit in Bernstein failed to differentiate
between an extension and the original tap order. 29 Thus, the court
30
held that failure to name the known tapee necessitated suppression.
Suppression, however, may be a drastic remedy when a tapee has no
prior criminal record and no prior record of electronic surveillance.
"1 509 F.2d at 1004. The Fourth Circuit noted that the statutory definition of an
aggrieved person does not mention prejudice. 18 U.S.C. § 2501(11) (1970). In contrast
to Doolittle, the Fourth Circuit further stated that § 2518(10)(a) did not allow the
district court to exercise discretion to determine the existence of prejudice.
126 497 F.2d 1020 (6th Cir. 1974).
127 The tap in O'Neill was obtained pursuant to N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 700.20
(McKinney 1971). See note 93 supra. The tap order provided that amending orders
must be applied for within three days should identities of the tapees be learned or
crimes not specified in the application be evinced. Id. § 700.40.
" The Sixth Circuit relied directly upon a decision by the New York Court of
Appeals construing the New York tap statute. People v. Gnozzo, 31 N.Y.2d 134, 286
N.E.2d 706, 335 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973).
iz See note 103 supra.
' The Kahn dictum, 415 U.S. at 155 n.15, tends to support the broad holding of
the Bernstein court, rather than extending to the suggested narrower holding which
would have required mention of the failure to name in an extension order. The failure
to name in an extension order may be more susceptible to attack than failure to name
in an original order where the "identity" of the tapee has not been expanded beyond
a mere name to include information gleaned from prior telephone conversations. The
fragility of the decision to name the suspect is illustrated by the declarations of the
district court in United States v. Bleau, 363 F. Supp. 438, 442 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd
sub nom. United States v. Bernstein, 509 F.2d 996 (4th Cir. 1975) (footnote omitted):
[I]f
the government, at the time the application is made, has probable cause to "know" the person, the application and order under terms
of Title IIImust name that person or suppression of that person's
monitored conversations will be appropriate.
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In that situation, identification of the tapee would neither facilitate
the Attorney General's statutory duty of authorizing tap applica3
tions, 3 nor aid the court in deciding whether to grant the order ,<
because the identification would in no way bear upon the probable
cause of that person's involvement in crime.' 33 Yet, the Fourth Circuit's holding in Bernstein seems to mandate that the suspect's name
must appear in all wiretap applications.
Furthermore, the Bernstein court assumed governmental bad
faith in the use of wiretap information. By hypothesizing that if the
government failed to prosecute an unnamed tapee, thus failing to put
him on actual notice of the tap, the government may secretly utilize
the information obtained from the tap by distributing it to other law
enforcement and governmental agencies,' 3 the Fourth Circuit readily
imputed bad faith without citing any evidence to buttress its position. Regardless of the likelihood of bad-faith law enforcement, the
protection of individual privacy must be balanced against the crimecontrolling purpose of Title 111.135 The approach of the Fourth Circuit
''

See note 97 supra.

,3,
See note 101 supra.

3 It is arguable that these reasons do not militate against disclosing the tapee's
name, and that to place the discretion of whether to name a tapee with the law
enforcement officers involved is unwise. But the failure to name the tapee in Bernstein
was apparently inadvertent, and not a deliberate exercise of discretionary power held
by the agents. To infer bad faith from the agents' failure to name the tapee when such
an accusation was not raised, is possibly to deter future good-faith law enforcement
endeavors. Since the tapee's name must appear in the application and order only if it
is known, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv) and (4)(a) (1970), a future Bernstein situation
may result in the agents claiming that the tapee's name was unknown, even if it was
not, in order to save the tap's evidence from suppression. Thus, even assuming governmental bad faith, the Bernstein holding may do no more than shift that bad faith from
the disclosure in the application stage to the initial identification stage itself.
Further, if the tapee's name was known, but not included in the application and
order, its omission arguably constitutes only harmless error. The prejudice standard
erected by the Fifth Circuit in Doolittle may have comfortably fit Bernstein. See text
accompanying notes 124-125 supra. Bernstein's only damage was that he was not put
on statutory notice. He did, however, receive actual notice of the taps through his
prosecution.
"1 509 F.2d at 1001.
13 REPORT 1097, supra note 92, at 70; CODE at 2157 stated: "The major purpose of
Title El is to combat organized crime." But see the statistical analysis in H. SCHWARTZ,
A REPORT ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (1971), where the
author concluded that the invasion of the privacy of "at least tens of thousands of
people [and the expenditure of] many, many millions of dollars [do not justify] a
...
Id. at 46 (emphasis
handful of convictions of gamblers, pushers and the like.
in original).
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in Bernstein, however, may frustrate the good-faith efforts of law
enforcement officials,' 36 where the suspect's identity in the original
tap or extension applications would in no way facilitate the requisite
probable cause determination. 13 7
D. Evidentiary Bar in Successive Prosecutions for MutuallyExclusive Offenses
The fifth amendment double jeopardy clause'38 prevents harassment from a second trial for the same offense.' 39 To further minimize
such harassment, courts have expanded the scope of the double jeopardy clause. 4 ' Methods developed to accomplish that expansion in
the larceny context include a mutually-exclusive offense rule' which
declares that a defendant cannot be convicted for stealing and for
receiving or possessing the same property. Of wider application is the
42
doctrine of collateral estoppel1
which precludes relitigation of an
See note 133 supra.
See notes 97 and 101 supra.
'
The fifth amendment states in pertinent part that: "[n]or shall any person
be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . ... U.S.
CONsT. amend. V. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Cross, 510 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1975).
,31The Supreme Court in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957) framed the
policy as follows:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the AngloAmerican system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts
to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him
to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in
a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
Id. at 187-88. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
"'0See, e.g., Note, Expanding Double Jeopardy: Collateral Estoppel And The
Evidentiary Use Of PriorCrimes Of Which The Defendant Has Been Acquitted, 2 FLA.
ST. U.L. REv. 511 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Expanding Double Jeopardy].
' See note 185 infra.
2,2 The expression of collateral estoppel as applied in civil procedure loses no force
when relied upon in a criminal case:
When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a
valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the
judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.
',
'3

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF JUDGMENTS

§ 68 (Tent. Draft No. 1 1973). The Supreme

Court in Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 579 (1948), stated that collateral
estoppel is to be utilized in criminal trials with a practical consideration of all the
case's circumstances. For a stronger declaration of this policy, see Ashe v. Swenson,
397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970). See, e.g., United States v. Friedman, 506 F.2d 511 (8th Cir.
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issue of law or fact which has been determined in a previous trial. The
Fourth Circuit in a rehearing en banc, divided on which of these two
rationales applied to bar the admission of evidence which had been
the subject of previous litigation involving the same defendant and
the same underlying transaction.'
In Phillips v. United States,' the defendant, on trial for bank
robbery,' had been previously convicted of knowing possession of
stolen bank money, 4 ' which crime the jury had been erroneously
instructed was a lesser-included offense. The district court set aside
this conviction because the possession charge was not included in the
bank robbery indictment. Phillips was then tried and convicted of
possession of stolen bank money. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
"' that his acquittal of the robbery charge in his first trial had
held 47
established Phillips's absence from the bank and that admission of
evidence in the possession trial showing his presence constituted re1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975); United States v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974); Williams v. United States, 179 F.2d 644,
650 (5th Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 70 (1951) ("A question or issue determined by a
prior acquittal may not be relitigated in a criminal proceeding against the same person.") For a concise sketch of collateral estoppel's emergence in federal criminal law
from the fifth amendment's guarantee against double jeopardy through res judicata,
see Comment, Ashe v. Swenson: CollaterelEstoppel, Double Jeopardy, and Inconsistent Verdicts, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 321, 327 n.43-47 and accompanying text (1971); see
generally Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513
(1949); Mayers and Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions,
74 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1960); McLaren, The Doctrine of Res Judicata as Applied to the
Trial of Criminal Cases, 10 WASH. L. REv. 198 (1935); Note, CollateralEstoppel: Its
Application and Misapplication,29 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 110 (1972).
"3 That both crimes here allegedly arose from the same incident suggests that the
Phillips court might have looked to the "same transaction" test as described by Mr.
Justice Brennan, concurring in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970): "[The Double
Jeopardy Clause requires the prosecution. . . to join at one trial all the charges against
a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction."
Id. at 453-54. But the "same evidence" test, described by the Supreme Court in
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), as "the test to be applied to
determine whether there are two offenses or only one, [by determining] whether each
provision [charge] requires proof of a fact which the other does not" is probably closer
to what Phillips and other cases discussing Ashe have considered because they have
concentrated upon the suppression of litigated facts rather than the broader policy of
compelling the prosecution to try all charges at once. Mr. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Ashe, viewed Ashe as a unique collateral-estoppel gloss upon the same evidence
test. Id. at 464.
14 518 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3163 (U.S.
Sept. 30, 1975) (No. 75-167).
14 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1970).
"' Id. (c).
"n 502 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1974).
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versible error. On rehearing en banc, a majority of the court held that
the Government was barred from presenting evidence of Phillips's
presence in the bank. Although six judges agreed upon this result,
three reasoned that the mutually-exclusive offense rule was the holding's basis, while three judges relied upon collateral estoppel. Four
judges opined that collateral estoppel was inapplicable. Judge Widener dissented, criticizing that "no rational basis has been exhibited
for our decision."' 48
The first basis for Phillips's holding, the mutually-exclusive offense rule, was announced by the Supreme Court in Milanovich v.
United States,' in which the Court held 5" that a defendant could not
5
be convicted for both stealing and receiving the same property.1'
Milanovich's mutually-exclusive offense rule focused upon the propriety of the trial judge's jury instructions, which should have advised
the jury that the defendant could only be convicted on one of the
charges, thus limiting the jury's choice of offenses to allow Milano5
vich to take advantage of the rule already established. 1
In Phillips, Judges Haynsworth, Craven and Butzner reasoned
that this rule would be violated by allowing a jury to believe that an
individual committed both crimes in a single act. This reasoning
extends Milanovich by converting a rule concerning double convic"1 518 F.2d at 111.
"'

365 U.S. 331 (1961).

,m Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Milanovich noted that "[ilt is hornbook law
that a thief cannot be charged with committing two offenses-that is, stealing and
receiving the goods he has stolen." 365 U.S. 551, 558 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting),
citing Cartwright v. United States, 146 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1944); State v. Tindall, 213
S.C. 484, 50 S.E.2d 188 (1948); see also United States v. Grant, 510 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.
1975), in which the defendant's convictions for conspiracy to commit bank robbery and
for possession of stolen bank money were affirmed, but the defendant received a
Milanovich instruction regarding stealing and receiving the same money; United
States v. Abercrombie, 480 F.2d 961 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1008 (1973);
United States v. O'Neill, 436 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1970); Thomas v. United States, 418
F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1969); Williams v. United States, 151 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1945).
,' The Milanovich Court held:

'[Iin the absence of a contrary indication by Congress, a defendant
charged with offenses under statutes of this character [18 U.S.C. §
641 (1970)] may not be convicted-and punished for stealing and also
for receiving the same goods.'
365 U.S. at 553-54 (1961), citing Milanovich v. United States, 275 F.2d 716, 719 (4th
Cir. 1960). For a brief note about Milanovich at the court of appeals level, see Note,
CriminalLaw-Effect of Judgment When One Count Is Improper, 63 W. VA. L. REv.
203 (1961). See generally Comment, Criminal Law-Larceny and Receiving Stolen
Goods Constitute Mutually Exclusive Crimes, 47 IOWA L. REv. 740 (1962).
M See note 150 supra.
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tion into an evidentiary prohibition.15 Unlike Milanovich, the possibility of conviction on the second offense remains after Phillips, leaving certain only that specific evidence will be inadmissible.
The expansion from Milanovich's jury instructions use of the
mutually-exclusive offense rule to Phillips'sevidentiary prohibition
is logical because of the impossibility of the offenses of stealing and
possession co-existing as convictions. Milanovich prohibited an accused's conviction of both offenses. A fortiori, the jury must not be
misled by instructions that he could be so convicted. Likewise, since
Phillipsprohibited an accused's conviction of both, the jury must not
be misled by the evidence that he could be so convicted. The difficulty with this analogy is that in a Milanovich situation the jury
theoretically might convict a defendant of both charges, 5 , while in a
Phillips situation, conflicting convictions would be impossible because the defendant has previously been acquitted of the larceny
charge. 5
Although acquitted of the larceny charge, Phillips was still adversely affected by it if certain evidence introduced in the first trial
was reintroduced in the second. Some evidence that might have
tended to show his participation in the robbery also tended to show
his implication in receiving the money. And since Phillips had uti1" That the Phillips court viewed the Milanovich or mutually-exclusive offense
rule as evidentiary is obvious from holdings numbered 3 and 6:
3. One may not be convicted and punished for both bank robbery
and possession of money stolen from a bank under 18 U.S.C. §§
2113(a) and 2113(c) as a result of a single occurrence [citing Milanovich] .... But one who is not guilty of bank robbery may be validly
convicted of possession and vice versa. (emphasis supplied)
6.

Since . . . evidence of Phillips's participation in the robbery

should not be admitted, the district court should exclude it if offered
by the United States.
518 F.2d at 110-11.
Heflin v. United States, .358 U.S. 415 (1959) may have served as a sounder basis
for the evidentiary rule formulated in Phillips than did Milanovich. The Milanovich
Court quoted its rule from the Fourth Circuit opinion below, which relied directly upon
Heflin. See note 151 supra for that rule. Heflin, like Phillips, was charged with two
offenses under the Federal Bank Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1970); see Prince v.
United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957).
1- The jury in a case like Milanovich is, albeit wrongfully, instructed that the
defendant can be found guilty of both offenses. The power is "theoretical" because the
situation, after Milanovich itself, should not actually occur. See, e.g., United States
v. Grant, 510 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1975). This situation does not arise in a case like
Phillipsbecause one trial has already occurred, in which the accused was acquitted.
"I Milanovich's rule was concerned with one trial, while the Phillips extension
necessarily required two trials.
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lized an alibi defense'56 at his first trial, "the pivotal factual question
in the jury's deliberation was whether Phillips was in the bank."' 15 7
Thus, the evidence and the issue of presence in the bank in Phillips's
first trial were also crucial in his second trial.
The second basis offered for the exclusion of the presence evidence
was collateral estoppel.'55 This basis was relied upon by Judges Winter, Russell and Field, but rejected by Judges Haynsworth, Craven,
Butzner and Widener.'59 The case relied upon by the three judges in
the rehearing was Ashe v. Swenson. 6 ' In Ashe, the defendant, after
having been acquitted of the robbery of one of six victims, was tried
and convicted of the robbery of another of the victims. The Supreme
Court, incorporating collateral estoppel into the fifth amendment
double jeopardy clause,'' reversed Ashe's conviction. The Court reasoned that the only conceivable issue for the jury was whether Ashe
had been one of the robbers, and the first trial had determined that
he had not. 6 ' Furthermore, the Ashe Court, by substituting the "rational jury" standard,'63 which examines whether there may be one
" The alibi defense put forth in Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958), was
rejected because the Court was uncertain of collateral estoppel's specification of which
issue the jury's verdict, which is "sometimes inconsistent or irrational," turned upon.
Id. at 472. The dissent to the original Phillipspanel's opinion, echoing this uncertainty,
stated that the "rational" jury, who had only implicitly acquitted Phillips of bank
robbery because of its (erroneous) finding of guilt on the "lesser included offense" of
knowing possession, had not necessarily deemed Phillips absent from the bank. 502
F.2d at 234 (Craven, J., dissenting). Regarding the "rational" jury, see text
accompanying note 163 infra. The concern expressed by Hoag and by the original
Phillips panel dissent is less cogent when the issues of the first trial can be seen as
tending to show either "evidentiary" or "ultimate" facts. What issue the jury focuses
upon then becomes less important because both of these kinds of facts may be excluded
from a second trial. See notes 167-168 infra.
1 502 F.2d at 231. See Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 (1972), in which the
Court held that a defendant acquitted of murder could not be subsequently convicted
of the accompanying robbery because the jury must have found the defendant not
present at the scene of the joint crime. That finding foreclosed the possibility of
conviction because this presence, necessary for guilt, could not be relitigated. Id. at
369.
's'

See note 142 supra.

518 F.2d at 111. Collateral estoppel was expressly held inapplicable to Phillips.
Id.
397 U.S. 436 (1970).
Ill

See note 138 supra.

397 U.S. at 445.
"rational jury" standard was described by the Ashe Court as determining
"whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that
which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration." 397 U.S. at 444, quoting
Mayers and Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New 7ials and Successive Prosecutions,74 HAv.
112

"I The

L. REV. 1, 38-39 (1960).
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or several reasonable bases for the jury's verdict, for the narrower
traditional "actually litigated and determined" standard," 4 broadened the scope of double jeopardy.'65 The Court in Ashe indicated
that the issues involved when applying the rational jury standard
must be "issue[s] of ultimate fact,"' 6 presumably as opposed to
issues of "mediate" or "evidentiary" fact.'67 This implies that the
determination of an ultimate fact in the first trial could not be redetermined in the second.
The application of collateral estoppel in Phillips would have extended Ashe because the estoppel adherents interpreted Ashe as barring the admission of evidentiary facts, as well as ultimate facts, in
subsequent prosecutions.' 8 Therefore, the evidentiary fact of
"' This standard was erected by the Supreme Court in Cromwell v. County of Sac,
94 U.S. 351, 353 (1876): "where it is sought to apply the estoppel of a judgment
rendered upon one cause of action to matters arising in a suit upon a different cause
of action, the inquiry must always be as to the point or question actually litigated and
determined in the original action . .. ."
'" See Expanding Double Jeopardy, supra note 140, at 535.
'"
397 U.S. at 443.
"v These distinctions were drawn by Judge Learned Hand in The Evergreens v.
Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944):
[A] 'fact' may be of two kinds. It may be one of those facts, upon
whose combined occurrence the law raises the duty, or the right, in
question; or it may be a fact, from whose existence may be rationally
inferred the existence of one of the facts upon whose combined occurrence the law raises the duty, or the right. The first kind of fact we shall
for convenience call an 'ultimate' fact; the second, a 'mediate datum.'
'Ultimate' facts are those which the law makes the occasion for imposing its sanctions.
Id. at 928; see Expanding Double Jeopardy, supra note 140, at 518. "Ultimate" facts
are not ultimate issues of the case. Note, Collateral Estoppel: Its Application and
Missapplication, 29 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 110, 113 n.23 (1972). See Note, Res Judicata-Matters Concluded-UltimateFacts or Mediate Data in First Suit Held Not
Conclusively Establishedas Mediate Datain Second Suit, 57 HARv. L. REV.921 (1944),
in which it was suggested that a mediate datum, or "evidentiary fact," which was
essential to the result of a case is identical to an ultimate fact, and that neither should
be used in a second suit. But see United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909, 917 (2d Cir.
1961), which warned against using The Evergreens' fact distinctions in criminal proceedings because of the different policy considerations involved.
I"The Fifth Circuit in Wingate v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1972), also
reached this conclusion. The Wingate court failed to detect any distinction in the
"quality of jeopardy" to which a defendant undergoing a second trial involving a
determined fact issue is exposed, which pivots upon that relitigated fact's being an
"ultimate" fact or an "evidentiary" one in the second prosecution. Id. at 213; accord,
Blackburn v. Cross, 510 F.2d 1014, 1017 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[T]here is no difference
between relitigating an ultimate fact or an evidentiary fact; relitigation of either is
prohibited.")
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Phillips's absence from the bank found in the first trial, could not be
used to show the ultimate fact, Phillips's knowledge"9 of the stolen
quality of the money, in the second trial. Thus, Phillips'suse of Ashe
would have been an evidentiary extension of the collateral estoppel
doctrine, analogous to Phillips'suse of Milanovich. Ashe held that a
second robbery trial was barred because the only ultimate issue for
the jury, Ashe's being a robber, had been determined in the first trial.
The Phillips rationale, however, prevents the admission of evidentiary facts tending to establish Phillips's presence in the bank, in a
second trial for a different offense.
Although the collateral estoppel doctrine would have barred the
same evidentiary fact as the mutually-exclusive offense rule in
Phillips, the two rationales will often yield different results. The
Milanovich rule applies only to a joint larceny-receiving kind of offense. An accused acquitted of a larceny charge cannot have evidence
which would have tended to prove his implication in the larceny
admitted into a later trial concerning his possession or receipt of that
larceny's proceeds. 7 ' Thus, the Milanovich rule, although expanded
by Phillips, remains of limited utility. Conversely, the collateral estoppel adherents' extension of Ashe would be available to a defendant
whenever the government attempts to raise issues of evidentiary fact
which have been finally adjudicated in the defendant's favor at a
previous trial. Thus, its potential use is boundless.171
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Phillips, by extending Milanovich
and by providing support for the extention of Ashe, widened the
protection of double jeopardy, which had historically been applied
only to protect a defendant against a prosecution for a previously
litigated offense.' The Fourth Circuit thus accepted the trend toward broadening double jeopardy to fit the requirements of contemporary criminal justice, with its potential multiple prosecutions for
16918 U.S.C. § 2113(c) (1970) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever receives, possesses . . . any property or money or other thing of value knowing the same to have
been taken from a bank . . . shall be subject to the punishment ...
" (emphasis
supplied).
11 See text accompanying notes 151-153 supra.
"I See Expanding DoubleJeopardy,supranote 140, at 535. The use of the doctrine
would be especially prevalent because a defendant's subjection to two trials is not
uncommon, given the government's tenacity regarding a particular defendant or incident. But cf. Mayers and Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive
Prosecutions,74 HARV. L. REv. 1, 32 & n.166 (1960), where the authors declare that
prosecutors are likely to be less determined than civil litigants.
In See, e.g., Note, Twice In Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 263 (1965).

1976]

FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

conduct constituting more than one offense'
of prior criminal conduct.'
E. Time Period for Motion
Jurisdictional

3

and its evidentiary use

to Reduce

Sentence

Not

The motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure' 5 provides a criminal defendant with an
opportunity to alleviate, to an extent, the harshness of a sentence.
Because the motion is essentially "a plea for leniency,"'' 5 judicial
disposition of a Rule 35 motion assumes a purely discretionary character.' This flexibility in the application of the rule was the basis of
a recent Fourth Circuit decision.
In United States v. Stollings,7 5 the defendant filed a motion for
reduction of his sentence 119 days after his conviction had been affirmed. Four days later, the federal district judge denied the motion,
asserting a lack of jurisdiction because he was unable to consider it
within the 120-day period set out in Rule 35."11 On appeal, the Fourth
',3 See, e.g., Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE
L.J. (1948).
"I Expanding Double Jeopardy, supra note 140, at 536.
1'7
Rule 35, FED. R. CRIM. P., provides in pertinent part:
The court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after the sentence
is imposed, or within 120 days after receipt by the court of a mandate
issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal

The Rule remains unchanged by the FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AMENDMENTS Acr of 1975, Pub. L. 94-64, 89 Stat. 370.
Other post-conviction remedies under the Rules include the withdrawal of a guilty
plea under Rule 32(d), the motion for a new trial under Rule 33, and the motion in
arrest of judgment because of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or the failure of the
pleading to charge an offense under Rule 34. See 8A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
35.03[3] (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as MooRs].
Further, besides habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 et. seq. (1970), Title 28 of the
United States Code, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970), provides for a prisoner's claim of release
on the following grounds: the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or
United States statutes, the court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence, the sentence was illegally excessive, or the sentence is otherwise vulnerable to collateral attack.
All of the above remedies are distinguished from the Rule 35 motion because of
its discretionary nature.
" MooRs, supra note 175,
35.02[4]; Poole v. United States, 250 F.2d 396, 401
(D.C. Cir. 1957). The Rule 35 motion is of course not a plea for leniency when an
illegally-imposed sentence is involved; see note 190 infra.
1" MooRE, supra note 175,
35.02[4].
179516 F.2d 1287 (4th Cir. 1975).
"I The judge stated that had he had jurisdiction he would have amended Stollings' three-year sentence to 179 days. Id. at 1288.

546

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXIII

Circuit held that filing of the motion tolled the rule's limitation period and therefore the district judge did not lose jurisdiction to consider a timely-filed Rule 35 motion at the expiration of the 120-day
period.8 0
By allowing a defendant who filed a Rule 35 motion within the
120-day period to have a judge rule on that motion after the period
had elapsed, the Fourth Circuit adopted an expanded reading of Rule
35,181 which is counter to the strict adherence to 120-day jurisdiction
prevailing in several circuits. 182 However, the Stollings court did align
itself with several federal courts"3 which have broadly interpreted
Rule 35.
"'

Id.

The Fourth Circuit had previously held, in reliance upon Rule 45(b), in United
States v. Koneski, 323 F.2d 862, 863 (4th Cir. 1963), that "[A] court may reduce a
sentence within sixty days [the period provided for before the adoption of the 1966
Amendments to the Federal Rules] after the sentence is imposed." See text
accompanying note 189 infra.
112 See, e.g., United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 918 (1968). Ellenbogen is perhaps the most frequently cited case in support of a
strict interpretation of Rule 35. However, its jurisdictional gloss of Rule 35, in reliance
upon Rule 45(b) and United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220 (1960), is dictum because
the Ellenbogen court had stated that the 120 day limitation in Rule 35 had nothing to
do with the Ellenbogen case. 390 F.2d at 540; see notes 186 and 189 infra. See also
United States v. Flores, 507 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Regan, 503 F.2d
234 (8th Cir. 1974); cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1006 (1975); Urry v. United States, 316 F.2d
185 (10th Cir. 1963) (per curiam); United States v. Chicago Professional Schools, Inc.,
302 F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1962).
l8 See, e.g., United States v. Janiec, 505 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 948 (1975). The Ninth Circuit is notable in its broad Rule 35 interpretations.
United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 509 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 962 (1975); United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1120 (1975); Leyvas v. United States, 371 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1967) Leyvas is
the principal case concerned with Rule 35 motions before the period of filing was
extended from 60 to 120 days. See note 181 supra. The Ninth Circuit in Leyvas drew
much of its reasoning on this issue from what is now MOORE, supra note 175, T
35.02[2], wherein it was stated that Rule 35's time period was not the period within
which the motion must be filed, but the time within which the court may act. Thus,
the court's failure to act precludes relief. But, it was noted, the rule should be rewritten
to allow the court to act upon a timely-filed motion, as this seems to be the common
course followed in most jurisdictions.
However, the present footnote in MOORE to this section cites Leyvas, and ironically
notes: "With the additional sixty days now allowed for the court to act upon the
motion, it will hopefully no longer be necessary to stretch the language of the Rule in
this way." MOORE, supra note 175, at 35-6 n.101. From Leyvas flowed Polizzi in which
it was held that the 120-day period warranted no change in the Leyvas reasoning. 500
F.2d at 896 n.73. The United States Dist. Ct. case reaffirmed the Leyvas holding as
extended by Polizzi, and provided in dicta that the time limitation after a timely
"'
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The Fourth Circuit in Stollings indicated several rationales militating in favor of a more flexible application of Rule 35. First, a judge,
for various reasons beyond the defendant's control, may be unable to
consider and act promptly upon a motion to reduce sentence., 4 Also,
because the common law rule that a court lost jurisdiction to act upon
such motions at the end of term was abolished by the adoption of
Rule 35, l'1 the federal rule was intended to create a definite timeframe within which convicted defendants could file their motions to
reduce.' Finally, a judge would not hold a motion in dormancy for
motion is filed should be sufficiently flexible to allow a judge to weigh new evidence
regarding the suitability of a defendant's sentence as long as such consideration occurs
with reasonable speed. 509 F.2d at 1356. This reasonable standard was adopted by
Stollings, 516 F.2d at 1288.
See also Fuentes v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 92 (D.P.R. 1973); United States
v. Ursini, 296 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Conn. 1968); Irizzary v. United States, 58 F.R.D. 65
(D. Mass. 1973); United States v. Gee, 56 F.R.D. 377 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
"I The Fourth Circuit suggested that these reasons might include the judge's
illness, his absence due to vacation or service in another district, or his preoccupation
in a protracted trial which should not be stalled for such unscheduled matters as Rule
35 motions. 516 F.2d at 1288. The court further noted that the time required to assemble witnesses and hold evidentiary hearings or both might extend beyond the 120 days
time-span, thus cancelling the defendant's good-faith motion. Id. at 1289. Cf. United
States v. United States Dist. Ct., 509 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir.) (Bums, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975) (delay caused by the preparation and transmission
of reports from prison bureaus or parole boards is described).
'1The Supreme Court has stated:
As a general practice, the sentence, when imposed by a court of record,
is within the power of the court during the session in which it is
entered, and may be amended at any time during such session, provided a punishment already partly suffered be not increased.
United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307 (1931), quoting F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL PLEADING AND PRAcrICE, § 913 at 641 (9th ed. 1899). In contrast, the Stollings court, 516 F.2d
at 1289 n.1, cited Gilmore v. United States, 131 F.2d 873, 874-75 (8th Cir. 1942),

quoting United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55 (1914). The broader language of Mayer
supports the expansion of a court's power to act. In Mayer, the Supreme Court stated
that, in the absence of a contrary statute, a court could not alter its final judgment
after the expiration of the term unless the proceeding for that purpose had commenced
during the term. Id. at 67.
For a discussion of the process of reducing sentence before the promulgation of
Rule 35, see 5 L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES § 35:3
(1967).
I" This Stollings rationale for a flexible reading of Rule 35 considered the philoso-

phy of that Rule as ensuring that "a new set of arbitrary and erratic rules" does not
replace the common-law end-of-term measure. 516 F.2d at 1289. Thus, a definiteness
is injected into the procedure of moving to reduce sentence which allows defendants
to ascertain exactly when Rule 35 motions must be lodged with a district court. Conversely, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 226 (1960),
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an unreasonable time only to grant it later on the basis of the mov87
ant's prison conduct.
In contrast to the rationales offered in Stollings, the decisions
adopting a stricter application'88 largely rely upon Rule 45(b)'s85 prohibition of time enlargement regarding certain rules, including Rule
35. As a result, these courts view the time limit as jurisdictional. 98
Furthermore, some courts have considered the language of Rule 35
itself to describe jurisdiction: "The court may reduce a sentence
within 120 days . . . ."I" This language, it has been held,' defines
when a court may act, not when a defendant may act. Other support
for the strict reading has been found in the Supreme Court's characterization of the Rule's abolition of the end-of-term measure as establishing "precise times within which the power of the courts must be
3
confined."1
However, in Stollings the Fourth Circuit implicitly recognized
that the nature of the motion to reduce sentence does not support a
strict reading of Rule 35. The 120-day period should exist as a safe
time-zone within which the defendant can move for sentence reduccharacterized the Rules' abolition of the end-of-term measure as erecting "precise
times within which the power of the courts must be confined" and was subsequently
relied upon by some courts against which the Fourth Circuit now stands in opposition.
See text accompanying note 182 supra.
117 Cf. MOORE, supra note 175,
35.02[1], at 34-5 n.5:
Some limitation on the court's power [regarding Rule 35 motions]
seems to be necessary, for after a lapse of time the peculiar ability of
the court to determine sentence gives way to the presumably greater
competence, and knowledge, of penal authorities.
But see FEDERAL DEFENDER'S PROGRAM OF SAN DIEGO, INC., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE IN THE UNITED STATES DIsTRicT COURT § 9.31(5), at 160 (1967) wherein the

showing of the defendant's positive attitude, especially as revealed by the statements
of probation officers or prison officials, is deemed helpful to the motion's judicial
disposition.
' See note 182 supra.

Rule 45(b), FED. R. Cium. P. provides in pertinent part:
[T]he court may not extend the time for taking any action under
Rules 29, 33, 34 and 35, except to the extent and under the conditions
stated in them.
'oThe time limit is not jurisdictional when an illegal sentence is involved. Rule
35, FED. R. CmaM. P. provides in pertinent part: "The court may correct an illegal
sentence at any time ....
''

Il See note 175 supra.

See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 507 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1975). The Flores
court also cited MOORE, supra note 175, 35.02[2] as supportive; see note 183 supra.
"I United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 226 (1960); see notes 182 and 186
supra. See, e.g., United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537, 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 918 (1968).
192
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tion.'1' Because the motion is but "a plea for leniency,"' 95 its consideration by the sentencing judge himself should be of the utmost importance,' 96 and this opportunity for the defendant should be preserved.
To insist that a timely-filed motion may be rendered invalid by the
inaction of a judge over whom the defendant has no control truncates
the 120-day period by an indbterminate time of judicial
consideration. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit's holding in Stollings
does not penalize a diligent defendant whose good-faith timely motion may otherwise have been the victim of any of.several caprices of
the adjudicative machinery.'97
F.

42 U.S.C. §1983

1. Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies

The doctrine of exhaustion of state administrative remedies requires that an individual present his complaint to available state
agencies organized to hear or review his claim before presenting it in
federal court.' A general requirement of exhaustion of adequate state
remedies has been codified in § 2254, the federal habeas corpus statute. 2 In contrast, recent cases3 indicate that exhaustion of state ad"' Under the strict interpretation, a defendant could conceivably move for a sentence reduction immediately after sentencing, yet fail to prevail on the motion because
of the neglect of the court to consider the motion within the 120-day time frame.
However, another defendant may file near the end of the 120-day period, as Stollings
did, and nonetheless succeed in having the motion considered within the period.
Clearly, the movant's good faith and diligence in the former example would have been
frustrated.
"g

See note 176 supra.

United States v. Hammer, 496 F.2d 917, 919 (5th Cir. 1974):
ITihe district judge who accepted the appellant's guilty plea and
sentenced him is the proper judge to adjudicate his Rule 35 motion.
See also, United States v. Harper, 460 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1972).
" See note 94 supra.
"'

I Cases distinguish between adequate judicial remedies and adequate administrative remedies. Exhaustion of judicial remedies, however, has been held not to be
required where federal rights are involved. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939);
Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970). The
exhaustion doctrine itself "is more often a self-imposed policy of restraint allowing
courts to narrow the scope of their jurisdiction." Note, Exhaustionof State Administrative Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act, 8 IND. L. REv. 565 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Exhaustion].
2 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970). Section 2254 provides that a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus will not be granted unless state judicial remedies have been exhausted or the
available state remedies are inadequate. The exhaustion requirement is further quali-
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ministrative remedies is not required under § 19831 of the Civil Rights
Act. 5 Rather, a non-exhaustion doctrine has prevailed which allows
petitioners to present their complaints in federal court without prior
recourse to state administrative procedures. 6 The differences in procedure under § 2254 and § 1983 have been highlighted in suits
brought by prisoners challenging the constitutionality of prison conditions. 7 Accordingly, the question of whether adequate state administrative remedies must be exhausted by a petitioner before proceeding in federal court has arisen in such suits. The Fourth Circuit in
McCray v. Burrell,' however, accepted the non-exhaustion doctrine
in a § 1983 suit challenging prison conditions without considering the
adequacy of an available state remedy
fled by the provision that a person must raise his complaint within the state "by any
available procedure" before seeking to enter federal court. Id.
See, e.g., Parham v. Dove, 271 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1959); Cobb v. City of Malden,
202 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1953); Davis v. Arn, 199 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1952).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
- Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HAv.
L. REV. 1486 (1969), pointed out that:
the requirement that a plaintiff exhaust state administrative remedies
before he may maintain a suit in equity under section 1983 was once
black letter law.
Id. at 1500. See text accompanying note 13 infra.
I See Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S.
639 (1968); Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 877 (1967); cf. Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669 (1972); Damico v. California, 389
U.S. 416 (1967); Gregory v. Wyse, 512 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1975); Spence v. Latting,
512 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1975).
1 See Armstrong v. Cardwell, 457 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1972); Coffin v. Reichard, 143
F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945); Park v. Thompson, 356 F.
Supp. 783 (D. Hawaii 1973). Procedural differences between § 2254 and § 1983 are
important since prisoners' complaints concerning prison conditions can be brought
under either statute. See note 31 infra.
&516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir.), petition for cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Nov.
4, 1975) (No. 75-44). McCray v. Burrell, 367 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Md. 1973), was consolidated with three other cases: McCray v. Smith (prisoner in isolation for forty-eight
hours without required medical attention); Stokes v. McClellan (prisoner denied right
to receive certain magazines); and Washington v. Boslow, 375 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Md.
1974) (prisoner deprived of necessary medical care). Each case involved a prisoner's
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) for deprivation of constitutional rights, and in
each case the district court dismissed the suit for failure to exhaust state administrative remedies. Considering McCray's suits on the merits, the Fourth Circuit found that
violations of the eighth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, had occurred, and that
denial of trial by jury was not reversible error due to the untimeliness of the petitioner's
request and a failure to make his demand in writing as required by FED. R. Civ. P.
38(b). 516 F.2d at 371.
1 Id. at 365.
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McCray, a prisoner in the Maryland Penitentiary, brought a suit
for infringement of his civil rights alleging cruel and unusual punishment and seeking damages arising from two incidents of solitary confinement.'0 The district court dismissed the suit" holding that the
claim could be adequately resolved by the statutorily-mandated
Maryland Grievance Board.'2 The Fourth Circuit, however, relying on
a line of Supreme Court cases,' 3 held that access to the federal courts
was available under § 1983 without prior exhaustion of state remedies.'4 Neither the existence nor the adequacy of such administrative
10 Id. at

367-69. Allegedly, these two incidents violated prison directives. McCray
was placed in an isolated cell without any clothes, blankets, or heat for forty-eight
hours. On a second occasion, he was placed in a mental observation cell for forty-six
hours without a mattress, blanket, clothes, or the medical attention required by the
directives.
" 367 F. Supp. at 1217. Citing an increased burden of prisoner-relief cases under
§ 1983 and the importance of "federal-state comity," the district court reasoned that
when the state remedy was adequate it should be exhausted prior to appeal in a federal
forum. The court suggested a three-part adequacy test which examined: (1) preservation of due process rights; (2) fair administration of available remedies; and, (3) "the
extent of the State's interest in the subject matter of the federal litigation." Id. at 1201.
1 While the Inmate Grievance Commission as established in MD.ANN. CODE art.
41, § 204F (Supp. 1975), does not provide for settlement of damages claims, it does
provide for a board, independent of the prison, to hear complaints. Appeals may be
made to the Secretary of Public Safety and Correctional Services and appeals taken
from there to the state circuit courts. Finding this procedure "adequate," the district
court stated:
the least the federal court can do is to give the State system a chance
to . . . purge itself of its abuses, which can only be done if inmate
complaints are channeled via the inmate grievance route.
367 F. Supp. at 1207. See Hayes v. Secretary of Dep't. of Pub. Safety, 455 F.2d 798
(4th Cir. 1972).
'1 See Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669 (1972); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S.
249 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968); Damico v. California, 389 U.S.
416 (1967); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961). These cases and their effect on the exhaustion doctrine are discussed fully
in Note, State Inmate's Challenge to Conditions of Prison Confinement is Cognizable
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Entailsno Requirement of Exhaustionof State Remedies,
72 COLUM. L. REv. 1078 (1972); Exhaustion, supra note 1, at 565; Comment,
Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies in Section 1983 Cases, 4 U. CHI. L. REv.
537 (1974).
"1Despite the existence of the Maryland Inmate Grievance Commission, the petitioner in McCray was not required to present the Board with his complaints. 516 F.2d
at 357. The Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape stated:
It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give
relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and
the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one
is invoked.
365 U.S. at 183.
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remedies was considered in McCray.'5 Instead, the court held that
there was an unqualified doctrine of non-exhaustion of state administrative remedies in a prisoner's suit under § 983.'1
The Fourth Circuit did not examine the adequacy of the available
state administrative remedies in the Supreme Court cases upholding
non-exhaustion under § 1983. The Fourth Circuit, however, did
recognize a recent Supreme Court decision which suggested the possibility of an exhaustion requirement under § 1983 where state remedies are adequate. In Gibson v. Berryhill,71 the Supreme Court held
that exhaustion was not required in that particular § 1983 suit because the available state administrative remedy was inadequate. An
exhaustion requirement in Gibson would have caused no deprivation
of rights until after the state administrative board had acted. Petitioners had sought an injunction against the board's proceedings to
revoke their optometrist's licenses, alleging that revocation would be
a denial of due process.' 8 No revocation had occurred when the § 1983
suit was brought. The Fourth Circuit distinguished Gibson on its
facts.' 9 In McCray, the prisoner had already allegedly been deprived
of his rights before he brought suit under § 1983. Also, since Gibson
did not specifically hold that exhaustion is required where available
state administrative remedies are adequate, 0 the Fourth Circuit re11The Fourth Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court precedents beginning
with Monroe, see note 13 supra, settled the issue of any requirement of exhaustion of
state administrative remedies under § 1983. The conclusion was that no such requirement exists under § 1983. Thus, whether or not an available state remedy was adequate
would be an unnecessary and irrelevant determination. 516 F.2d at 365.
" Id. at 364-65.
,7 411 U.S. 564 (1973). The Fourth Circuit also cited one district court opinion,
Kochie v. Norton, 343 F. Supp. 956 (D. Conn. 1972), requiring exhaustion of adequate
state administrative remedies in prisoners' suits under § 1983. 516 F.2d at 363.
411 U.S. at 566-570.
i, 516 F.2d at 363-64. The Fourth Circuit emphasized that in Gibson any deprivation of rights would only occur after the administrative hearings. Conversely, in
McCray, the constitutional rights of the prisoners were allegedly infringed before any
complaint to the federal court or an administrative board. Relying on Toney v. Reagan,
467 F.2d 953, 956-57 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1130 (1973) and Whitner v.
Davis, 410 F.2d 24, 28-29 (9th Cir. 1969), the Fourth Circuit stated:
The rationale of this distinction-which we need not adopt or reject
to decide the cases before us-is that exhaustion may be necessary
only when it assures that a decision of state officials depriving plaintiff
of a civil right is final, so that the case is ripe for adjudication.
516 F.2d at 364. The McCray majority asserted that because of this distinction there
was "only an indirect expression" in Gibson that exhaustion might be required in
limited situations and therefore seemed to give little weight to the case in their decision. Id. at 364-65.
" 411 U.S. at 574-75.
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fused to rely on any implications from the Supreme Court's opinion
that exhaustion would be required in such cases. Consequently, the
Fourth Circuit did not consider the adequacy of the available state
administrative remedy present in McCray. Rather, the court interpreted Monroe v.Pape" and subsequent Supreme Court cases2 as
strictly adhering to a non-exhaustion doctrine in § 1983 suits despite
suggestions in Gibson that the adequacy of the state remedy may
require exhaustion before proceeding in the federal courts.2
In addition, the McCray majority failed to distinguish between
exhaustion under § 1983 and § 2254. Section 2254 requires exhaustion
in habeas corpus proceedings where the state's administrative remedies are available and adequate 4 before the petitioner can proceed in
federal court. Since the adequacy of administrative remedies was not
considered in McCray,2 the question of whether any relationship
exists between § 1983 and § 2254 was not discussed. Thus, any anomaly arising from requirement of exhaustion under § 2254 and not
under § 1983, before suits concerning prison conditions can enter
federal court, was not examined by the court. Instead, the Fourth
Circuit confined itself to the Supreme Court decisions concerning
§ 1983.26
The dissent pointed out that the majority, relying solely on these
decisions, had failed to recognize the "erosion" of the strict nonexhaustion doctrine in § 1983 suits. Judge Widener asserted that the
state administrative remedy in McCray was adequate and that the
Supreme Court had never decided such a case.? Thus, the precedent
21

365 U.S. 167 (1961).

See notes 13 and 15 supra.
516 F.2d at 364-65.
24 See note 2 supra. Suits concerning prison conditions may be brought by
prisoners under § 2254 as well as § 1983. Thus, there is a conflict between the two
statutes because § 2254 requires exhaustion and § 1983 permits non-exhaustion. Petitioners can, therefore, avoid the requirements of § 2254 by bringing their suits under
§ 1983. See text accompanying notes 41-42 infra. The problem exists, however, primarily in cases of federal habeas corpus. Thus far, the state courts have denied habeas
corpus relief for suits concerning prison conditions. See Comment, Habeas Corpus-Prison Management-Custody and Control of Prisoners-Constitutional
Law-Former Jeopardy, 25 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 684 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Habeas Corpus]; note 31 infra.
516 F.2d at 365. See note 15 supra.
Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669 (1972); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249
(1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416
(1967); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961).
21 516 F.2d at 375 (Widener, J., dissenting).
21 Id.

at 377.
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relied upon by the McCray majority was questionable, especially in
light of Gibson, in which the Supreme Court implied that nonexhaustion may only be required where state remedies are inadequate.29 The dissent contended, therefore, that the issue of the adequacy of a state remedy was important in the context of § 1983
exhaustion. Despite the majority's failure to consider the implications of an exhaustion requirement under § 2254,10 the dissent reasoned that the policy of requiring a prisoner to exhaust his state
administrative remedies before petitioning for a writ of federal habeas corpus was equally applicable to § 1983. 31 Since § 2254 requires
exhaustion only when adequate state remedies are available, adequacy of administrative remedies would also be important in § 1983
complaints. Therefore, the majority's failure to consider adequacy
within the context of exhaustion resulted in reliance on seemingly
inapplicable Supreme Court precedent and prevented discussion of
a § 2254-§ 1983 relationship.
McCray illustrates the difficulties inherent in the statutory exhaustion requirement of § 2254, the conflicting non-exhaustion doctrine of § 1983, and the issue of the adequacy of state administrative
remedies under both sections. Recently, suits challenging prisoner
conditions have been allowed in federal court under either § 2254 or
§ 1983.32 Under § 2254, the, exhaustion requirement is applicable.
29 In each of the Supreme Court cases relied on by the McCray majority, the
available state administrative remedy was inadequate. Thus, exhaustion would have
been futile. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1973), suggested that in cases
like McCray, an exhaustion requirement would still be viable. See text accompanying
notes 17-23 supra.
516 F.2d at 377.
21 Judge Widener, dissenting, stated:
There is assuredly no policy reason for the courts not to apply the
customary and general law of requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies merely because a case is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
This is conclusively shown by the exhaustion doctrine developed with
reference to habeas corpus cases.
516 F.2d at 377.
'2Until recently, prisoners' complaints concerning prison conditions could be presented in federal court only under § 1983. Courts refused to hear such suits under
§ 2254 and asserted that prison administrators were the proper authorities to handle
these complaints. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Breeden v. Jackson, 457 F.2d
578 (4th Cir. 1972); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971). A writ of
habeas corpus was only available to challenge the constitutionality of confinement and
not the conditions. See Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968); Williams v. Steele,
194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 822 (1952); Habeas Corpus, supra note
24, at 684.
The courts' refusal to hear these cases was substantially eroded by Johnson v.
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Under § 1983, however, a suit which could have been brought under
§ 2254 need not meet the exhaustion requirement.3 To maintain
uniform treatment of such complaints, certain courts have reasoned
that there is a need for an exhaustion requirement under § 19831,
before the prisoner can proceed in federal court."
In applying § 2254's requirement of exhaustion of adequate state
administrative remedies to prisoners' suits brought pursuant to that
section, the courts have relied on several factors to justify an exhaustion requirement. Federal-state comity," administrative expertise, 7
and a need for uniformity and efficiency in the administration of
criminal justice" were the reasons for codifying exhaustion in § 2254.11
Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). Johnson relied upon the rationale expressed in Coffin v.
Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945), which had
extended habeas corpus relief to conditions imposed during confinement. The circuit
court in Coffin had stated that relief under § 2254 was available if:
[the petitioner] is deprived of some right to which he is lawfully
entitled even in his confinement, the deprivation of which serves to
make his imprisonment more burdensome than the law allows or curtails his liberty to a greater extent than the law permits.
143 F.2d at 445. Accord Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971). Approval of this
extension of habeas corpus relief has been "sparse". See Habeas Corpus, supra note
24, at 90. It has also been recognized, however, that the avoidance of an exhaustion
requirement induced a prisoner to complain under § 1983. Id. at 692.
m McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 364 (4th Cir.), petition for cert. granted, 44
U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1975) (No. 75-44).
3 See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475
(1973); Spence v. Latting, 512 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1975); Wishart v. McDonald, 500 F.2d
1110 (1st Cir. 1974); Bradley v. Weinberger, 483 F.2d 410 (1st Cir. 1973).
See McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 357 (4th Cir.) (Widener, J., dissenting
petition for cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1975) (No. 75-44).
u A respect for state authority and state administrative decisions compelled codification of exhaustion. By requiring a prisoner to exhaust state remedies, federal interference is avbided and thus federal-state friction is reduced. See Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475 (1973); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); note 38 infra.
3 Administrative agencies supposedly have a more developed knowledge and record of incidents within their field than do the courts. A prison board could also be
more attuned to local prison conditions, and their decisions and findings of fact could
aid the federal court. See Exhaustion, supra note 1, at 566. Comment, Exhaustion of
State Administrative Remedies in Section 1983 Cases, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 537, 552
(1974).
38 Exhaustion by state administrative boards would provide uniform treatment of
each prisoner's suit. Appeal to the federal courts would still be available for the § 1983
petitioner who is unsuccessful at the state level. McCray v. Burrell, 367 F. Supp. 1191
(D. Md. 1973). Uniformity does exist to the extent that exhaustion has not been
required under any statute when the administrative remedy is inadequate or requires
inordinate delay. See Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34 (1972); Marsh v. County School
Bd., 305 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1962); Farley v. Turner, 281 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1960); Note,
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The rationale for applying exhaustion principles to the state administrative agencies is to avoid federal-state friction, which would otherwise result if the courts ignored such agencies." Exhaustion of administrative remedies not only reduces federal-state friction but also provides for a more effective and efficient resolution of disputes.' The
expertise of the state agency enables certain disputes to be resolved
without recourse to the federal courts. In disputes which are
eventually litigated in the federal courts, the agency's administrative
process provides the court with a detailed record. Furthermore, the
agency is compelled to recognize and remedy deficient areas within
its own administration.2 Thus, administrative exhaustion under §
2254 reduces the judicial caseload, permits uniform treatment of prisoners' suits, and utilizes state administrative expertise.
These reasons should be equally compelling if prisoners' suits are
brought under § 1983 and the available state remedies are adequate. 3
Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1038 (1970).
"' See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Ex parteHawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944); Note,
Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1038 (1970).
' See note 35 supra.
" See notes 36-37 supra.
42 See McCray v. Burrell, 367 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Md. 1973); Note, Limiting the
Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1486 (1969); note
12 supra.
The district court in McCray stated:
While it can be argued that exhaustion is required in these cases
because Congress specifically provided for it, the rationale supporting
such a requirement under § 1983 is no less compelling. [This] Court
notes that while exhaustion in habeas corpus actions is also provided
by statute, the Supreme Court had required exhaustion prior to Congress enacting [§2254] in 1948.
367 F. Supp. at 1201. And in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), the Supreme
Court concluded:
The strong considerations of comity that require giving a state court
system that has convicted a defendant the first opportunity to correct
its own errors thus also require giving the States the first opportunity
to correct the errors made in the internal administration of their prisons.
Id. at 492 (footnote omitted).
A further argument for exhaustion of adequate state remedies under § 1983 can
be made when the history and purposes underlying that section are examined. In
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the Supreme Court stated that the main reason
for § 1983 was "to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced
.Id.
at 180. Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Preiserv. Rodriguez, asserted;
'The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal
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A concern for uniformity of the law and possible partial emasculation
of § 2254 seemingly demands a requirement of exhaustion under
§ 1983. Otherwise, since exhaustion of state administrative remedies
is not codified in § 1983, a suit brought under this statute would
bypass the doctrine; a state prisoner could go directly to the federal
courts to challenge prison conditions44 despite available state grievance boards and administrative remedies. Therefore, without an exhaustion requirement under § 1983, § 2254 is weakened to the extent
that it is available for suits concerning prison conditions.
By failing to consider the applicability of the § 2254 exhaustion
requirement to § 1983 and the adequacy of the Maryland Grievance
Board to hear prisoners' complaints, the Fourth Circuit in McCray
may have equated § 1983 and non-exhaustion too easily. Indeed, the
district court held that McCray had an adequate remedy which
should have been exhausted before petitioning the federal courts."5 If
the remedy was adequate, the Fourth Circuit's statement that any reexamination of the exhaustion doctrine should be left to the Supreme
Court or Congress46 is seemingly unsubstantiated. As the dissent
pointed out,4" the Supreme Court has never considered a § 1983 case
such as McCray, where state procedure provided an adequate administrative remedy.
rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color
of state law . . . .'
411 U.S. at 516, quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880). Impliedly, inadequate local enforcement of federal rights, rather than of states' laws, was the primary
fear upon which the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), was premised. Only
where the law either was not applied (lack of an available state remedy) or was unconstitutionally applied (presence of an inadequate state remedy) was § 1983 necessary.
Therefore, as one commentator has noted:
the legislative intent was not to create a complete substitute for all
state remedies, but rather to provide a federal remedy where state
remedies are inadequate on their face or in practice ....
Comment, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies in Section 1983 Cases, 41 U.
CHI. L. REv. 537, 554 (1974). Thus, where state administrative remedies are adequate,
they should be exhausted.
11 See cases cited in note 6 supra. In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973),
the petitioner's suit for a return of credits for good behavior was denied under § 1983
but allowed under § 2254. Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting, pointed out that:
the Court's holding. . . rests on an understandable apprehension that
the no-exhaustion rule of § 1983 might, in the absence of some limitation, devour the exhaustion rule of the habeas corpus statute.
Id. at 503.
See note 11 supra.
516 F.2d at 365.
Id. at 375.
41 Id. at 377. See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
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In the cases cited by the McCray majority in support of its holding, the state administrative remedy was either inadequate or futile.49
Two of the cases,50 for example, examined judicial rather than administrative remedies. 5' Two others5 2 stated that exhaustion of available
remedies would be futile and thus did not impose such a requirement. 3 Finally, two of the cases54 concerned the constitutionality of
state statutes. Administrative review by state agencies would certainly be an inadequate remedy in suits challenging statutory constitutionality." Thus, the precedent upon which the Fourth Circuit re" The Fourth Circuit relied primarily on six Supreme Court cases: Carter v.
Stanton, 405 U.S. 669 (1972); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); Houghton
v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968) (per curiam); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967)
(per curiam); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961).
5' McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961).
1, Exhaustion of state judicial remedies is not required where federal rights are
involved. See note 1 supra. Both Monroe and McNeese involved petitions for a federal
remedy in federal court. The Supreme Court refused to require exhaustion of remedies
in the state court system prior to proceeding in federal court. See Eisen v. Eastman,
421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
52 Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639
(1968).
5 While Houghton and Wilwording concerned state administrative remedies, the
Supreme Court in Houghton specifically pointed out that exhaustion of the available
remedies would be futile. 392 U.S. at 640. Final appeal in the state administrative
process was to the State Attorney General, and he had already stated that the prison
had acted correctly before any appeal was made. Id. The Supreme Court then stated
that "in any event" exhaustion under § 1983 is not required, citing Monroe, McNeese,
and Damico. Wilwording relied on Houghton with no consideration of the available
administrative remedies or their adequacy. The Court did point out, however, that
cases could be brought to federal court under § 1983 if they were "not subject, on the
basis of their allegations, to exhaustion requirements." 404 U.S. at 251 (emphasis
added). Thus a broad statement of non-exhaustion under § 1983 was qualified. Because of the type of allegations made in Wilwording, no state administrative remedy
was adequate. As the Supreme Court pointed out, no Missouri court had ever granted
a hearing on prison conditions. Id. at 250. The Court did not note whether administrative remedies were even available.
11Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669 (1972); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416
(1967).
- Both Carter and Damico involved suits challenging the constitutionality of
various welfare statutes. A state administrative remedy was available, but the
Supreme Court, like the Fourth Circuit, relied on Monroe and McNeese in not requiring exhaustion. If those two cases applied only to state judicial remedies, then Dam ico
should be so limited. Recent cases, however, have suggested that Carterand Dam ico
apply only when the constitutionality of a statute is challenged under § 1983. Eisen v.
Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970); Kochie v.
Norton, 343 F. Supp. 956 (D. Conn. 1972).
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lied is of questionable persuasiveness where available administrative
remedies are adequate. Nevertheless, the decision in McCray was in
accord with most of the other courts which have examined the exhaustion question in prisoners' suits under § 1983.56
The majority of cases brought pursuant to § 1983 have held that
a prisoner is not required to exhaust state administrative remedies
before proceeding in federal court. 57 Yet, certain circuit courts have
stressed that their holdings were premised upon the inadequacy of
the available state remedy. 8 These circuits did not, therefore, foreclose consideration of a case such as McCray, where the state administrative remedy may have been sufficient to alleviate a plaintiff's
complaints. 9 Thus, the question of the adequacy of such remedies
under § 1983 has not been conclusively resolved by courts which have
considered that question. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, may have
been insensitive to the positions of other circuit courts on the exhaustion question where adequate state administrative remedies existed.
An alternative to the Fourth Circuit's approach to exhaustion in
McCray would be to utilize a two-tier test when considering prisoners'
suits brought under § 1983. First, the availability of a state administrative remedy would be ascertained. Second, the adequacy of that
remedy would be examined. If the administrative remedy is adequate, exhaustion of its procedures should be required under § 1983
before a prisoner proceeds in federal court. Such an approach would
provide uniform treatment of prisoners' suits involving conditions of
confinement under both § 2254 and § 1983 and would utilize established, adequate state administrative remedies. Indeed, various
The following courts have not required exhaustion of state remedies: McClelland v. Sigler, 456 F.2d 1266 (8th Cir. 1972); Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir.
1972); Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971); Jones v. Superintendent, 370
F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Va. 1974). See, Exhaustion, supra note 1, at 582.
"' See cases cited in notes 47 and 54 supra.
"' See Spence v. Latting, 512 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1975); Blanton v. State Univ., 489
F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1973); Brooks v. Center Township, 485 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 911 (1974); Ray v. Fritz, 468 F.2d 586 (2d Cir. 1972); Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970); Kochie v. Norton,
343 F. Supp. 956 (D. Conn. 1972); Hayes v. Cape Henlopen School Dist., 341 F. Supp.
823 (D. Del. 1972).

51Such flexibility also suggests a shift in the courts' attitudes. Instead of citing
the cases following Monroe and abruptly concluding that exhaustion is not required,
courts are examining the viability of non-exhaustion when the state administrative

remedy is arguably adequate. It would seem, therefore, that courts recognize that
exhaustion will be required when a case arises involving adequate state administrative
remedies. See Spence v. Latting, 512 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1975); Plano v. Baker, 504 F.2d
595 (2d Cir. 1974); Palmigiano v. Mullen, 491 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1974).
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courts have chosen this two-tier approach."0
The Fourth Circuit in McCray was clearly presented with an opportunity to examine the adequacy of the Maryland Grievance Commission Act in a suit under § 1983. The court rejected the opportunity, however, by relying on the doctrine of non-exhaustion of state
administrative remedies in such suits. A better approach for the
Fourth Circuit would have been to apply a two-tier test by asking
whether the prisoner in McCray had an available state administrative remedy and, if so, whether that remedy was adequate. If the
remedy was adequate, the prisoner would be required to utilize it
before proceeding in a federal court. That approach seems to emphasize the advantages of requiring exhaustion" without compromising
a petitioner's right to later proceed, if necessary, in federal court.
Notwithstanding the merits of the two-tier approach, the Fourth Circuit in McCray at least furthered uniformity by equating § 1983 suits
with non-exhaustion of state administrative remedies.
2.

Transcripts in Collateral Proceedings

The federal civil rights statute, § 1983,' enables prisoners to challenge alleged deprivations of their constitutional rights during
confinement. Cases recently decided by the Supreme Court2 have
established guidelines for differentiating actions allowable under §
60 See cases cited in note 56 supra. Cases have also distinguished Monroe,
McNeese, Damico, Houghtonand Wilwording by pointing out that the state remedies
were inadequate and therefore exhaustion could not be applied.-See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669 (1972); Blanton v. State
Univ., 489 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1973); Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970); Kochie v. Norton, 343 F. Supp. 956 (D. Conn. 1972).
11By requiring exhaustion, states will be encouraged to correct their own defective
prison conditions and to adopt regulations resulting in less repetitious complaints and
greater efficiency. Also, the federal caseload under § 1983 will be reduced, while federal
relief will still be available for the § 1983 petitioner who is unsuccessful at the state
level. McCray v. Burrell, 367 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Md. 1973); Comment, Exhaustion of
State Administrative Remedies in Section 1983 Cases, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 537 (1974).

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
2 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475
(1973).
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1983 from those permitted under the habeas corpus statutes.3 In
Preiserv. Rodriguez,4 the Supreme Court held that an application for
a writ of habeas corpus was maintainable when challenging the fact
or duration of confinement, whereas a proceeding under § 1983 would
be proper if challenging the conditions of confinement. 5 Thus, if the
challenge goes to the actual fact of confinement or its duration, the
suit must be brought under the habeas corpus statute despite an
alleged deprivation of a constitutional right.6 Although the Preiser
decision seemed to limit the bases for § 1983 suits,' the Supreme
Court subsequently clarified its position. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 8 the
Court stated that its holding in Preiserwould only foreclose a § 1983
action where injunctive relief affecting the length of confinement was
requested.' Thus, § 1983 remains an effective method to contest alleged deprivations of constitutional rights if only damages or declaratory relief are sought. A person can even request injunctive relief if
limited to enjoining conduct not affecting the duration of confinement.' 0
The Fourth Circuit utilized these guidelines in deciding several
recent cases." In Arey v. Turner, the indigent plaintiff brought an
action under § 1983 challenging the denial of his constitutional right
3 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254, 2255 (1970).
' 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
Id. The Preiser Court stated:
When a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus
will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.
Id. at 499. This language in Preiseris susceptible to sweeping interpretation since it
can be construed to apply to "conditions" of confinement that do not affect the actual
fact or duration of the confinement. See generally Plotkin, Rotten to the "Core of
Habeas Corpus". The Supreme Court and the Limitations on a Prisoner'sRight to
Sue; Preiseru. Rodriguez, 9 CRIM. L. BULL., 518, 525-27 (1973).
' The Court analyzed the language of the two statutes and held that specific
provisions of 28 U.S.C.§ 2254 (1970) took precedence over the general terms of 42
U.S.C.§ 1983 (1970). Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973).
7 Hypothetically, a lower court could interpret Preiserto require a § 1983 action
challenging the constitutionality of solitary confinement to be brought as a habeas
corpus action since it challenges the "fact" of confinement. Note, Habeas Corpus PrisonManagement - Custody and Control of Prisoners- ConstitutionalLaw - Former
Jeopardy, 25 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 684, 696 n. 79 (1975).
418 U.S. 539 (1974).
Id. at 554-55.
20 Id. at 555.
1 Cole v. Williams, Civ. No. 74-2266 (4th Cir. July 7, 1975); Daye v. Turner, Civ.
No. 74-1153 (4th Cir. July 1, 1975); Arey v. Turner, Civ. No. 74-2360 (4th Cir. June
17, 1975).
12Civ. No. 74-2360 (4th Cir. June 17, 1975).
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to transcripts of all judicial proceedings against him.' 3 The district
court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that it was maintainable only as a § 2254 habeas corpus action. The Fourth Circuit disagreed,' 4 but held that the plaintiff did not have an actionable claim
because he failed to demonstrate a "particular" need for the transcripts.'5 The court based its decision on a prior Fourth Circuit case' 6
requiring a particularized showing of need before an indigent will be
provided a free transcript for use in a subsequent collateral proceeding under § 1983."1 To evidence the requisite need, the defendant
must show, according to the Fourth Circuit, more than a general
desire to search the record in an attempt to discover an error. He
must clearly define which part of the transcript contains the alleged
error.' 8 In an earlier § 2254 habeas corpus action,' 9 the Fourth Circuit
had also required the same showing of specific need to receive a free
20
transcript in a collateral proceeding.
' Id. at 10.

' The Fourth Circuit analyzed the right to a transcript as a condition of confinement, thus making the action maintainable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) under the
rationale of Preiser and Wolff. Civ. No. 74-2360 at 11.
,5 Civ. No. 74-2360 at 11.
IS Jones v. Superintendent, 460 F.2d 150, aff'd on rehearing,465 F.2d 1091 (4th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1973). Other circuit court decisions requiring a
showing of need are: Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325 (1st Cir. 1971); Chavez v. Sigler,
438 F.2d 890 (8th Cir. 1971); Hines v. Baker, 422 F.2d 1002 (10th Cir. 1970).
" 460 F.2d at 153.
" United States v. Glass, 317 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1963). An alternative theory of
need would require the defendant to show that he had exhausted all other routes for
securing a transcript such as borrowing a co-defendant's or the state's copy. Only upon
demonstration of exhaustion of all possibilities would a need be found to exist. Wade
v. Wilson, 396 U.S. 282 (1970).
" United States v. Shoaf, 341 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1964). This is a logical extension
of the specific need requirement since whether the statutory authority relied on is civil
rights or habeas corpus, both actions are postconviction collateral actions which are
attempts to avoid, defeat, or evade a conviction by use of an incidental proceeding that
is not a part of the appeals process. In addition, both actions are independent civil
suits. Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959). See, H. KERPER & J. KERPER, LEGAL
RiGHTS OF THE CONvIcTED 207 (1974).
20 Several other circuits require that a particularized need be shown. Cowan v.
United States, 445 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1971); Bentley v. United States, 431 F.2d 250
(6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 920 (1971); Benthiem v. United States, 403 F.2d
1009 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 945 (1969). The Supreme Court has declined
to decide whether an indigent prisoner must make a preliminary showing of need in
order to receive a free transcript in a collateral proceeding. Wade v. Wilson, 396 U.S.
282 (1970). In Wade, the Supreme Court said that the facts of this particular case
would not require a decision concerning the novel question of a constitutional right to
a transcript for use in a collateral proceeding. Id. at 286.
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The rationale behind the Arey requirement of need is that the
issues normally raised in a collateral proceeding should be readily
recalled by the prisoner without the need of a transcript. 2' However,
the Ninth Circuitz' recently declined to follow this reasoning, deciding that a transcript should be provided to a habeas corpus petitioner
without any preliminary showing of need. Employing equal protection concepts,2 the court found that forcing a prisoner to rely on his
memory for finding a basis on which to attack collaterally his convic2
tion violated the prisoner's right to fundamentally fair treatment.
While the Fourth Circuit requirement of a preliminary showing of
need may discourage frivolous attacks on valid convictions, it may
jeopardize equal treatment under the law.25 The Supreme Court recognized that a state has no duty to make the indigent defendant
totally equal to his wealthy counterpart.2 6 However, the Court also
held that the state must insure indigent defendants' access to the
courts and the opportunity to present their claims fairly. 27 The reUnited States v. Shoaf, 341 F.2d 832, 835 (4th Cir. 1964).
" MacCollom v. United States, 511 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1974), petition for cert.
granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Oct 7, 1975) (No. 74-1487).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The court in MacCoom analyzed the situation
of the indigent prisoner in comparison to that of his "wealthy cellmate" and found that
allowing the latter to comb the record for mistakes while forcing the indigent to rely
on his memory violates the fundamental fairness required under the equal protection
clause. 511 F.2d at 1122. The contrary position relies on a recent Supreme Court
decision that a state need not provide an indigent with the identical "legal arsenal"
of a prisoner capable of paying. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974). Therefore, a
transcript for use in a collateral proceeding is not essential to insure fair treatment for
the indigent.
21 511 F.2d at 1122. The MacCollom court also relied on recent dictum of the
Supreme Court that seems to question the "need" prerequisite for obtaining a transcript. In Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971), the Supreme Court expressed
doubt that the failure of a defendant to state why the transcript might be useful would
be sufficient reason to deny him the transcript. 404 U.S. at 228. See generally, Comment, The Indigent's Right to a Transcript of Record, 20 KAN. L. REV. 745 (1972).
25 511 F.2d at 1123. The MacCollom court also held that cost was not a significant
factor. Id. at 1123-24. Although there would be an increased expense to the government, the increase would be minimal since there is already a requirement for a transcript in every proceeding in the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) (1970). In
addition, the fact that many prisoners have transcripts from previous direct appeals
supports the conclusion that the increased monetary cost to the government would not
create a significant burden. See Comment, The Indigent's Right to a Transcript of
Record, 20 KAN. L. REV. 745 (1972). In many cases, the cost of opposing a demand for
a transcript exceeds the cost of providing the transcript. Hardy v. United States, 375
U.S. 277, 279 n.1 (1964).
2 Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974).
" Id. at 612.
21
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quirement to specify a need for a transcript is certain to curtail severely the number of prisoners' actions, thereby limiting free and fair
access to the courts. 28 In addition, the Supreme Court has decided
that equal protection and the right of access to the courts requires an
adequate prison law library.2 9 Unless an indigent prisoner is provided
a transcript without a particularized showing of need, the prisoner
will be in the anomalous position of having the state provide him with
the tools to learn his rights under the law without the concomitant
necessary source of relevant facts from his own case. Thus, the decision in Arey also undermines the benefit of a law library to a prisoner
attempting to attack collaterally his conviction.
3.

Medical Claims

A prisoner can also invoke § 198331 for the denial or inadequacy
of medical treatment as cruel and unusual punishment under the
eighth amendment 2 ' In Cole v. Williams, 2 the Fourth Circuit for the
first time held that gross indifference to a prisoner's medical condition is actionable under § 1983. The plaintiff, a prisoner in a Maryland state prison, alleged that he was assaulted by another inmate
and struck in the eye but was not allowed medical attention for two
weeks. The plaintiff further alleged that once he was allowed an
examination by a prison doctor, he was treated with total indifference
and that only because of his persistence was he permitted to visit a
specialist who stated it was too late to save any vision in the eye.3
Traditionally, federal courts hesitate to give relief for claims alleging medical mistreatment.2 The reluctance can be traced to two
sources. First, realizing that the administration of state prisons is an
integral part of the state's criminal justice system, the federal courts
show great deference to state prison officials' decisions concerning the
2' See R. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 219 (2d ed. 1969). Professor Sokol takes
the position that the relevant inquiry should not be "why does the prisoner have a right
to a transcript?" but "why doesn't he have a right?" In addition he points out that
providing a transcript is one issue where it would not be difficult to make the indigent
and the non-indigent equal. Id.
Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam).
3, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970); see note 1 supra.
" U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, § 1. The eighth amendment was made applicable to
the states in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
312 Civ. No. 74-2266 (4th Cir. July 7, 1975).
3 Id. at 2.
3 See Note, Eighth Amendment Rights of Prisoners:Adequate Medical Care and
Protection from the Violence of Fellow Inmates, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 454 (1973).
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medical care provided prisoners. 5 Second, courts refer to their inadequate knowledge to make medical judgments. 6 A complaint alleging
mere negligence without a showing of exceptional circumstances is
generally treated by the courts as failing to state a cause of action
under § 1983. 31 Conversely, if the complaint alleges either a total
denial of medical services or willful indifference to a prisoner's serious
physical condition, the courts hold that an actionable claim exists.3
In Cole, the Fourth Circuit sustained plaintiffs complaint as actionable. 3 The court found that the claim was not the inadequacy of
the actual medical care received, but the unreasonable delay between
the request for care and first treatment." While the Fourth Circuit
relied on the Eighth Circuit decision in Sawyer v. Sigler,4' the holding
in Cole extends the time during which a prisoner can claim prison
interference with medical care. Sawyer held that once medical treatment is prescribed the prisoner has a constitutional right to that
treatment and prison administrative officials may not interfere,
hinder, or deny the prisoner access to that care. 2 In comparison, the
Fourth Circuit's holding in Cole extends the proscription to interfer2 Henderson v. Thrower, 497 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1974); Robinson v. Jordan, 494
F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1974); Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1974) vacated on other
grounds sub nom., Cannon v. Thomas, 419 U.S. 813 (1974). See note 34 supra.
"' Cates v. Ciccone, 422 F.2d 926 (8th Cir. 1970). The court in Cates stated that
the decision about proper medical treatment is best made by a physician. Furthermore, unless the prisoner alleges obvious neglect or intentional mistreatment, the
judgment of the prison physician will be conclusive. Id. at 928.
V Wilbron v. Hutto, 509 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1975); Church v. Hegstrom, 416 F.2d
449 (2d Cir. 1969); Lunsford v. Reynolds, 376 F. Supp. 526 (W.D. Va. 1974). The
prisoner still may have a traditional tort action under state law. Spicer v. Williamson,
191 N.C. 487, 132 S.E. 291 (1926). See Note, Eighth Amendment Rights of Prisoners:
Adequate Medical Care and Protectionfrom the Violence of Fellow Inmates, 49 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 454, 460 (1973).

11Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1974); accord, Bishop v. Stoneman,
508 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir. 1974); Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1974); Fitzke
v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072 (6th Cir. 1972); Sawyer v. Sigler, 320 F. Supp. 690 (D. Neb.
1970), aff'd 445 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1971). A good compendium of cases concerning
prison medical treatment can be found in 2 M. HAFr & M. HERMANN, PRISONERS'
RIGHTS 384-87 (1972).
Civ. No. 74-2266 at 5.
Id. at 7.
' 320 F. Supp. 690 (D. Neb. 1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1971).
12 In Sawyer, the prison warden directly interfered with the physician's judgment
on the proper method of taking medication and the court held that the prisoner had a
right to treatment as prescribed by the physician. In addition, the court struck down
a prison regulation that penalized a prisoner's "good time" for time spent in the
hospital. Id. at 695, 699.
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ence prior to the time any medical treatment is prescribed.13 Thus,
the Fourth Circuit expanded the constitutional right found in
Sawyer.
Once a court is satisfied that the complaint alleges more than
simple negligence, 44 certain criteria become relevant to establish the
merits of the claim.- First, the court should determine whether the
prisoner evidenced a serious disease or injury noticeable to prison
officials. Second, the court should examine whether the potential for
harm by reason of delay or denial of medical attention was substantial. Third, the court must determine if actual serious harm did result
and, if so, whether the harm was directly caused by the delay or
denial of medical treatment.46 If the plaintiff is able to satisfy these
criteria, the Fourth Circuit, in view of its decision in Cole, will probably grant appropriate relief.
4.

Application of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

One of the primary advantages47 to a prisoner proceeding under §
1983, 48 as opposed to § 2254,11 is that the former permits a full civil
suit including the use of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5' The
4' Cole v. Williams, Civ. No. 74-2266 at 7.
"See text accompanying note 37 supra.

4 Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1974) vacated on other grounds sub
nom., Cannon v. Thomas, 419 U.S. 813 (1974); Schmidt v. Wingo, 368 F. Supp. 727
(W.D. Ky. 1973), aff'd, 499 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1974).
11In Cole, the prisoner reported trouble with his vision immediately after being
assaulted. The complaint of harm was a substantial lack of visual acuity, and the
prisoner permanently lost vision in the injured eye. Cole v. Williams, Civ. No. 74-2266
at 2.
"7 The other advantage of a civil rights action under § 1983 is that the prisoner
does not have to meet the state exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970).
A relative disadvantage of the civil rights action, however, is that it gets no priority
on the court's docket while a hearing for a habeas corpus action must be held within
eight days after the petition is filed unless good cause for allowing additional time is
shown. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1970).
,' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
4, 28 U.S.C.§ 2254 (1970).

5oWhile a habeas corpus action is characterized as "civil," it is a unique proceeding and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure normally do not apply. Harris v. Nelson,
394 U.S. 286, 292-98 (1969); see Cohen, Some Considerationson the Origins of Habeas
Corpus, 16 CAN. B. REV. 92 (1938). See note 19 supra. There has been discussion of
expanding the applicability of the Rules to habeas corpus. See R. SOKOL, FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS 143-46 (2d ed. 1969); Note, Civil Discovery in Habeas Corpus, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 1296 (1967); Note, Multiparty Federal Habeas Corpus, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 1482 (1968).
1, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 496 (1973). In an action brought under 42
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Fourth Circuit decision in Daye v. Turner 2 effectuates this practical
advantage. The prisoner in Daye filed a pro se suit under § 1983
alleging numerous violations of his constitutional rights. 53 Since an
action under § 1983 is an independent civil suit, there is no constitutional right to counsel. Therefore, many indigent prisoners do not
have the assistance of an attorney in prosecuting their actions. 4 In
Daye, the defendant prison officials successfully moved for summary
judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' The
Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that although the prisoner had been
mailed a copy of the motion, there was insufficient opportunity to
respond since he had not been informed of the consequences of failing
to submit supporting affidavits in opposition to the motion.
The purpose of the Rule 56 summary judgment procedure is to
examine all available pre-trial information to determine if a genuine
issue exists as to any material fact.5 7 Since summary judgment operates as a final adjudication,55 courts use the procedure cautiously. 9
In Daye, the Fourth Circuit found that the lower court failed to use
sufficient caution in granting summary judgment because it did not
insure that the prisoner was aware of his rights and duties. As a
consequence, the lower court failed to determine thoroughly whether
there was a genuine issue in the case. The court's error was aggraU.S.C. § 1983 (1970), the prisoner can take advantage of the liberal provisions for
depositions and discovery (Rules 26-37), for service of process (Rule 5), and joinder of
parties (Rules 19-21). In comparison, the procedure under habeas corpus is both strict
and limited. If the writ issues to the custodian, a hearing quickly follows at which the
officials state the authority under which the prisoner is being held. 28 U.S.C.§ 2243
(1970). The prisoner can deny the answers given and evidence is taken either orally or
by deposition. 28 U.S.C.§ 2246 (1970). The court has wide discretion to hear the facts
presented and shall "summarily. . . dispose of the matter as law and justice require."
28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1970).
Civ. No. 74-1153 (4th Cir. July 1, 1975).
Id. at 2.
5 Zeigler & Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se Actions
in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 157 (1972).
11 Civ. No. 74-1153 at 2. The relevant part of Rule 56 provides that in resisting a
motion for summary judgment which is supported by affidavits and other evidence, a
party may not rest on mere allegations, but must bring to light specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
" Civ. No. 74-1153 at 5.
" 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2712
(1973).
5' Id. at § 2715.
8, Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); e.g., Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 69 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Va. 1946), aff'd on other grounds,
163 F.2d 289 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 841 (1947).
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vated further by the burden of proof problem. The party moving for
summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any
issue of material fact, while the party opposing summary judgment
need only show some valid disagreement over a material fact to defeat
the motion." The prisoner in Daye needed only to present limited
evidence to defeat the prison officials' motion. Therefore, by granting
summary judgment against the plaintiff because of his ignorance of
procedure, the lower court further failed to acknowledge the established preference against granting summary judgment as evidenced
by the respective burdens of proof.
A court has the discretion to deny a motion for summary judgment even if the moving party has technically met its burden."' One
purpose for this discretion is to permit flexibility in a suit involving
a party operating under any type of handicap.2 In reversing the lower
court, the Fourth Circuit found that Daye was an appropriate case
for the trial court to exercise this discretion, 3 since the indigent prisoner who files a pro se complaint labors under a dual handicap. First,
the prisoner's indigency may prevent him from securing the advice
of an attorney, and second, his confinement may hinder efforts to
secure evidence needed for the supporting affidavits in opposition to
the summary judgment motion. An alternative available to the trial
court would be a denial of summary judgment followed by an evidentiary hearing. The court could also adopt a local rule to handle these
special situations by allowing a party to oppose a motion orally.6'
Regardless of the method used by the trial court, the Fourth Circuit's
concern in Daye that the prisoner be given a fair chance to challenge
60 First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968). The issues of burden
of proof and presumptions in Rule 56 summary judgment procedure are discussed in
Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine:A CriticalAnalysis, 83 YALE L. J. 745
(1974).
11Williams v. Howard Johnson's Inc., 323 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1963); see also 10 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, Federal Practice and Procedure; Civil § 2728 (1973).
62 Curry v. Brown, 142 U.S. App. D.C. 231, 440 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Hudson
v. Hardy, 134 U.S. App. D.C. 44, 412 F.2d 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1968) aff'd on rehearing,
137 U.S. App. D.C. 366, 424 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Phillips v. United States Bd.
of Parole, 122 U.S. App. D.C. 235, 352 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1965); cf., Illinois State
Employees Union, Council 34 v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 928 (1973); Tarantino v. Eggers, 380 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1967); Calo v. Paine, 385
F. Supp. 1198 (D. Conn. 1974).
63

Civ. No. 74-1153 at 5.

Such a local rule was recently upheld as not violative of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Jefferson v. Asplund, 467 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1972); Dredge Corp. v.
Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 461-62 (9th Cir. 1964).
64
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a summary judgment motion will have an effect on future § 1983
actions brought by indigent prisoners. These plaintiffs will be assured
of a fair opportunity to present their claims when confronted with a
Rule 56 motion and will not find their actions summarily curtailed.
5. Due Process Hearing Required for Revocation of Conditional
Pardon
The criminal defendant, while subject to several different sanctions upon conviction, 5 is sometimes pardoned,66 either immediately
following conviction or following a prison term. The pardon may be
either absolute or conditional.6 7 If the defendant is pardoned conditionally, his status is analogous to that of the parolee, 8 especially
since both may be returned or sent to prison upon revocation of the
parole or pardon.69 The Fourth Circuit in Pope v. Chew70 considered
whether the conditional pardonee in revocation proceedings was entitled to the procedural due process requirements of notice and an
opportunity to be heard. 7 The court held he was entitled to those
rights.
In Pope, the petitioner had been convicted of murder in 1936. A
year later his death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment,
and in 1962 he was granted a conditional pardon by the governor of
73
Virginia. 72 After several alleged breaches of the pardon conditions,
11

There are three basic sentencing alternatives open to the court: payment of a

fine, a prison sentence, or probation. R. DAWSON, SENTENCING 70 (1969).
11Pardoning occurs relatively infrequently. See, e.g., VIRGINIA DEP'T. OF WELFARE
AND INSTITUTIONS, ANNUAL REPORT,

1973-1974:

PROBATION AND PAROLE, YOUTH SERVICES,

41 (1974).
" There appear in Virginia, for example, several categories of pardons: absolute,
conditional, and simple without conditions, with "simple without conditions" perhaps
being subdivided into "simple pardons" and "pardons without conditions." Note,
Pardons in Virginia, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 307, 310 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Pardons], reprintedin part in L. ORLAND, JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT, TREATMENT 547 (1973).
IS See text accompanying notes 94-96 infra.
" VA. CODE ANN. § 53-262 (Supp. 1975) provides for the revocation of parole and
for the Board's discretionary order of reincarceration or reinstatement of parole. VA.
CODE ANN. § 53-256 (Repl. Vol. 1974) provides that, if reincarceration is ordered, "at
large" time is not counted as service of sentence. Burgess v. Cunningham, 205 Va. 623,
139 S.E.2d 110 (1964). The court in Wilborn v. Saunders, 170 Va. 153, 195 S.E. 723,
725-26 (1938) held that the conditional pardonee's "at large" time is not credited as
service of sentence. See Clifton v. Beto, 298 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D. Tex. 1968), aff'd, 411
F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1969).
70 521 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1975).
7'See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950); Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863).
72 See VA. CONST. art. V, § 12. For a succinct history of Virginia's constitutional
CORRECTIONS, GENERAL WELFARE
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the Virginia Parole and Probation Board recommended revocation of
Pope's pardon. This was effected without notice to Pope, and he was
given no opportunity to be heard either before the Parole Board's
recommendation or before the governor's revocation. 74 Pope brought
a civil rights action under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act75 against the
Board, seeking declaratory relief and damages.76 Summary judgment
was granted for defendants in the district court. 77 Upon appeal, the
Fourth Circuit held that Pope should have received the protections
of procedural due process.
The Pope court emphasized that despite the wording of the 1962
pardon, which suggested an automatic revocation upon violations of
the conditions therein, the governor had exercised discretion7 in orexecutive clemency provisions, see 2 A. HOWARD,

COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION

640-48 (1974). See also Wilborn v. Saunders, 170 Va. 153, 195 S.E. 723
(1938) (reaffirming the power of Virginia's governor to issue conditional pardons, and
the binding effect of the conditions on the pardonee); Lee v. Murphy, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.)
282 (1872); cf. Ball v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. (8 Leigh) 1051 (1837); Commonwealth
v. Fowler, 8 Va. (4 Call) 644 (1785).
1 The conditions of the pardon bound Pope to good conduct and provided for his
supervision by the Virginia Parole Board and for the nullification of his pardon upon
conviction for a Virginia offense. 521 F.2d at 402 n.2. Cf. Wilbom v. Saunders, 170 Va.
153, 195 S.E. 723, 724 (1938).
According to the Parole Board's July 1973 letter to the governor, Pope had been
charged in 1963 with several offenses arising from a hit-and-run incident, which
charges were later dismissed. He later violated some of the parole agreement's provisions and in April of 1973 he was convicted of possession of a controlled drug and
sentenced to three years imprisonment.
1, Virginia did not statutorily provide for a hearing of any kind in parole revocations until 1975. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-262 (Supp. 1975); see Hamrick v. Peyton, 349 F.2d
370 (4th Cir. 1965); Hudson v. Youell, 178 Va. 525, 17 S.E.2d 403 (1941), modified,
179 Va. 442, 19 S.E.2d 705, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 630 (1942) (common law rule regarding proceedings to establish breach of conditional pardon is followed in absence of
statutory reservation to governor of power to declare breach). Cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2304 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
" 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
76 Pope's suit was directed against the Chairman of the Virginia Parole and Probation Board and members of that Board. The damages were denied because Parole
Board members perform a quasi-judicial function in considering parole applications
and are therefore not subject to § 1983 damage suits. Cruz v. Skelton, 502 F.2d 1101
(5th Cir. 1974); Lambur v. Chew, 356 F. Supp. 751 (E.D. Va. 1973).
11 521 F.2d at 400.
78 The Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972) had been
presented with the argument that parole revocation was such a wholly discretionary
process that a hearing would be administratively impossible. The Court rejected the
argument and declared that an informal hearing of the kind contemplated in
Morrissey, and now adopted in Pope, would not interfere with the exercise of discretion. Id. The Morrissey Court's declaration is even more cogent when directed toward
OF VIRGINIA
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dering the cancellation of Pope's pardon because he had ex parte
"evidence" concerning Pope's alleged wrongdoings. Since the revocation was upon ex parte evidence and within the governor's discretion,
the Fourth Circuit reasoned that Pope should have been allowed to
present evidence favorable to himself."
The Fourth Circuit set up a procedure to assure procedural due
process to pardonees. First, a hearing 0 must be held by the Parole
Board before it forwards its recommendation to the governor, and the
pardonee must be allowed to be present at this hearing. Also, a transcript of the hearing should accompany the Board's recommendation.
Finally, the pardonee or his counsel' must have the opportunity to
pardon revocations because there, the discretion normally lies in one man rather than
in a board. S. RuBIN, H. WEIHOFEN, C. EDWARDS, & S. ROSENZWEIG, THE LAW OF CRIMI-

CORREcrION 591 (1963). The Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973),
extending Morrissey to cover probation revocations, reaffirmed the importance of a
hearing in providing for "the informed use of discretion." Id. at 785.
NAL

11521 F.2d at 405.
M The Morrissey "minimum requirements of due process" applicable to parole
revocations are:
...(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be
heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence;
(d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless
the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole board. . . and (f) a written statement by the factfinders
as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
408 U.S. at 489.
The state in Pope had hoped to justify the total disregard of any hearing when
the conditional pardon's violation was a conviction by relying upon the following
Morrissey language: "Obviously a parolee cannot relitigate issues determined against
him in other forums, as in the situation presented when the revocation is based on
conviction of another crime." 408 U.S. at 490. The same language had been used by
the Fourth Circuit in Gaddy v. Michael, 519 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1975) to illustrate the
importance of an early hearing after the execution of a parole violator's warrant diminishes somewhat when the parole violation rests on an intervening conviction. Id. at 675
n.13. Cf. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell
v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). The court in Pope clarified its use of
Morrissey's language in Gaddy by interpreting the language as stating simply "that
proof of a conviction introduced at a revocation hearing, precludes any attempt to
prove that the crime was not committed." 521 F.2d at 404 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). This is particularly relevant in Pope because, as the court points out,
there is no indication that the governor received any evidence at all of Pope's pardon
violations beyond the bald accusations of the Board's letter.
81The Pope court did not address the question of counsel for the pardonee but
seemed to assume counsel's presence: "[T]he pardonee or his counsel should be
allowed to submit a written rebuttal to the recommendation." 521 F.2d at 405.
Morrissey expressly did not reach the issue of counsel. 408 U.S. at.489. Gagnon de-
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submit a written rebuttal to the Board's recommendation.
The Fourth Circuit's application of due process to the revocation
of conditional pardons represented an extension of the Supreme
Court's decisions in Morrissey v. Brewer,82 where due process was
afforded in parole revocations, and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, where due
process was afforded in probation revocations. The Court in
Morrissey, while recognizing the restricted quality of the parolee's
liberty, held that the liberty right was "valuable"8 and worthy of
fourteenth amendmentO protection. The Supreme Court was cognizant, nonetheless, of the state's interest in the expeditious return of
a recalcitrant parolee to prison without engaging in a new adversary
trial. By treating the parolee "with basic fairness," society's interest
in rehabilitating a parolee to produce a useful citizen would not be
jeopardized. 6 In balance, the Court believed that the parolee's liberty
interest outweighed the state interests.
The Supreme Court in Gagnon continued Morrissey's analysis of
balancing state and individual interests. The state, declared the
Court, has an interest in accurate fact-finding87 to ensure that a successful rehabilitation is not interrupted. Moreover, the state has an
interest in the safety of the community in which the probationer
would live upon release. However, the defendant has an interest in
maintaining his liberty. Again, as in Morrissey, the Supreme Court
in Gagnon believed that the individual's liberty interest outweighed
the competing state interests. Thus, Morrissey, Gagnon and now
Pope illustrated the importance of notice and hearing coupled with
clared that the right to counsel in probation revocations be approached on a case-bycase basis. 411 U.S. at 788; accord, Bearden v. South Carolina, 443 F.2d 1090, 1095
(4th Cir. 1971) (parole revocations); cf. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
92 408 U.S. 471 (1972); see, e.g., Note, An Endorsement of Due Process Reform In
Parole Revocation: Morrissey v. Brewer, 6 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 157 (1973) (footnote
omitted).
" 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
" 408 U.S. at 482. The basic values of unqualified liberty. about which the
Morrissey Court spoke included gainful employment and the freedom to be with
friends and family "and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life." Id.
The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part:
...No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ....
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
" 408 U.S. at 484.
"

This accurate fact-finding is made possible by the due process hearing.
411 U.S. at 785.

FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

1976]

the notion that an individual's liberty interest takes priority over the
substantial state interests present in revocation proceedings.
Pope was foreshadowed by the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Bearden v. South Carolina.9 The court in Bearden held that the sixth
amendment 0 and the due process guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment' do not require states to provide counsel to indigents at
parole revocation hearings.92 Moreover, although notice and opportunity to be heard are not necessary before issuing a parole violator's
warrant, due process does require that, within a reasonable time after
arrest, the parolee be given notice of his alleged violation and an
opportunity to rebut that allegation. This opportunity includes the
right to be heard pro se before a Board representative, and a right to
present voluntary witnesses.93
Although the holding in Bearden appears to be similar to the
Fourth Circuit's holding in Pope, the difference may lie in Bearden's
application to parolees while Pope concerned conditional pardonees.
Although there are differences between parole and pardon," the
Fourth Circuit in Pope indicated that the government had not suggested how the "liberty interests"" of a conditional pardonee were
distinguishable from those of a parolee or a probationer. The concepts
of parole and pardon are virtually alike concerning restraints of liberty because both the parolee and the conditional pardonee are
"under the continued custody of the state and underconditions that
- 443 F.2d 1090 (4th Cir. 1971). The Pope holding was also presaged by the Sixth
Circuit in Fleenor v. Hammond, 116 F.2d 982 (6th Cir. 1941). Although called "the
first case to hold that even when provided for by the terms of the pardon, -evocation
without notice and hearing is unconstitutional," Weihofen, Revoking Probation,Parole Or PardonWithout A Hearing,32 J. Cam L.C. & P.S. 531, 532-33 (1942) (footnote
omitted), Fleenor required a due process hearing only if the defendant could contend
that he could fully demonstrate at such a hearing that none of the conditions of his
pardon had been breached. 116 F.2d at 987. Such provisional due process is of course
inconsistent with Morrissey and Gagnon.
" The sixth amendment includes the right to a speedy trial, a trial by jury, the
right to confrontation, and the right to have the assistance of counsel. U.S. CONST.
amend VI.
" See note 85 supra.
2 See note 81 supra.
,3443 F.2d at 1095.

" Parole differs from pardon in three general aspects: parole does not imply
societal forgiveness, while pardon does; parole is usually administered by an executive
board while pardon normally issues from the governor and parole necessarily follows
imprisonment whereas pardon may be extended either before or after incarceration.
S. RUBIN,

H.

WEIHOFEN,

546-47 (1963).
,1521 F.2d at 404.
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permit his reincarceration in the event of misbehavior."96
The Fourth Circuit in Pope recognized that a conditional pardonee's substantial liberty interest deserves the same procedural due
process protections afforded to the parolee and probationer by the
Supreme Court in Morrissey and Gagnon. These liberties, with their
attendant potential for "grievous loss,"97 exceed in importance the
interests of the state in a summary revocation. The discretion of the
governor, implied the Pope court, must not be unilaterally exercised
to dissolve these liberties98 any more than should be the discretion of
a parole or probation board. Thus, the extension of due process to the
conditional pardonee in Pope represents a predictable application of
the Supreme Court's holdings in Morrissey and Gagnon.
28 U.S.C. § 2254'

G.

1. Expansion of Federal Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction
The applicability of habeas corpus has expanded significantly
within the last decade. 2 For example, the Supreme Court has held
that a prisoner need not be incarcerated at the time his habeas corpus
action arrives at a final disposition. 3 The result of this holding is that
a prisoner's action will not be mooted solely because he is no longer
confined. In addition, the Court has held that a prisoner need not
seek relief from present restraint,4 thus allowing attack on indictments and convictions other than the one under which the prisoner
is confined. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court firmly established habeas corpus as the exclusive remedy for a prisoner attacking
" RUBIN, supra note 94, at 546, quoting from 4 ATORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF
RELEASE PROCEDURES 4 (1939).

"7Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) quoted in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 481. See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970); Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
9sThe Pope court stated that "no one would argue that an executive could revoke
any pardon whimsically." 521 F.2d at 404. Cf. Ex parte Paquette, 112 Vt. 441, 27 A.2d
129, 132 (1942): "In the eye of the law, the conditionally pardoned convict is looked
upon as being constantly in the custody of the Governor, who is regarded as his jailer,
and has 'him always ... upon a string that [he] may pull at pleasure,'" quoting In
re DePalo, 101 Vt. 510, 144 A.2d 678, 679 (1929).
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970).
See Note, Habeas Corpus - PrisonManagement - Custody and Control of Prisoners - Constitutional Law - Former Jeopardy, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 684 (1975).
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
2
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the fact or duration of his confinement and seeking speedier relase.5
Accompanying this conceptual expansion has been a corresponding
liberalization of the jurisdictional prerequisites for a habeas corpus
action. The statute which confers habeas corpus jurisdiction on the
federal courts limits the power of each court to grant the writ only
within its "respective jurisdiction." 6 The Supreme Court in Ahrens
v. Clark7 interpreted this language to require the prisoner to be "in
custody" within the territorial jurisdiction of the district court before
the petition could be granted. Recent decisions by the Court have
attempted to ease the restriction of Ahrens and expand federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.'
Among the procedural habeas corpus cases decided by the Fourth
0
Circuit9 was Norris v. Georgia,1
in which the court limited further
5 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). See text accompanying notes 4-10
at 561.
' 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (1970). The statute states that the power to grant a writ of
habeas corpus is held by "the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts
and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions."
7 335 U.S. 188 (1948).
RIn Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224 (1970), the Court noted the restrictive nature
of the rule in Ahrens and called for a legislative change. Id. at 228 n.5.
In Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973) the Court modified
Ahrens to the extent that a prisoner could initiate an action in a district within a state
that had lodged a detainer against him.
A major procedural problem in habeas corpus petitions is the exhaustion of state
remedies requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970) under which state prisoners must
exhaust completely their remedies in the state courts before petitioning for federal
relief. See note 47 at 566.
In Gilstrap v. Godwin, 517 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1975), the petitioner contended that
when the trial court denied his motion to dismiss the indictment, he had exhausted
his state remedies since the state supreme court would not review interlocutory orders.
The Fourth Circuit held that under applicable Virginia law, the petitioner had not
adequately exhausted his state remedies since habeas corpus was available as a pretrial as well as post-trial procedure. Id. at 53.
In Byrd v. Guilford County Superior Court, Civ. No. 75-1056 (4th Cir. July 9,
1975), the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed an exception to the state exhaustion requirement
that when the state prosecuting authorities request that a federal court take a case,
the federal court can properly exercise jurisdiction. Id. at 2. Accord, Jenkins v. Fitzberger, 440 F.2d 1188 (4th Cir. 1971). The other circuits have reached the same conclusion,
e.g., United States ex. rel. Boyance v. Myers, 372 F.2d 111 (3rd Cir. 1967); Warren v.
Connor, 365 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1966). The Fourth Circuit based its finding on the theory
that habeas corpus should be a flexible concept of comity rather than a strict jurisdictional rule. Jenkins v. Fitzberger, 440 F.2d at 1190.
In Ange v. Paderick, 521 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1975), the petitioner raised a claim
that he had been prevented by his indigency from posting bail at his federal arraignment. Since the petitioner had been previously convicted for a state offense which he
had not begun serving, he argued that by not receiving credit toward his state sentence
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relaxation of jurisdictional requirements for habeas corpus. The
plaintiff in Norris was incarcerated in North Carolina and brought a
habeas corpus action there seeking relief from detainers" filed by
during his federal pre-trial confinement, he was being forced to serve a greater state
sentence because of his indigency. This situation has previously been found to be
violative of a prisoner's constitutional right to equal treatment under the law. United
States v. Gaines, 449 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1971). The majority in Ange was favorably
impressed with this argument, but since it had not been raised below, remanded the
case to the district'court for consideration. However, as Judge Widener's dissent points
out, petitioner had also not raised the claim in the state courts, thereby failing to
exhaust state remedies as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970). 521 F.2d at 1070
(Widener, J., dissenting); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971). The majority in Ange
does not mention this issue but the Supreme Court has expressly stated that the
exhaustion of state remedies rule would be useless if a petitioner could raise one issue
before the state courts and another before the federal courts. Id. at 276. While the
petitioner in Ange may have had a.meritorious case, the state courts were the proper
forum in which to initiate the claim. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971); accord,
Slayton v. Smith, 404 U.S. 53 (1971); Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224 (1970); Darr v.
Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950); Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399 (1900).
In addition to the problem of exhaustion of state remedies, the Fourth Circuit
dealt with other procedural problems such as the giving of the "Allen" charge to juries.
Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). If, after a reasonable amount of time, a
jury cannot reach a verdict, the judge may give the "Allen" charge by telling the jurors
that absolute certainty is not needed to convict and jurors in the minority should reexamine their positions. In United States v. Stollings, 501 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1974),
the Fourth Circuit held that the prisoner's substantive rights had not been violated
by giving the unmodified charge at his trial. The Fourth Circuit has approved a
modified version of the "Allen" charge. United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335 (4th
Cir. 1970). See, United States v. Hogan, 486 F.2d 222 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 991 (1974); United States v. Davis, 481 F.2d 425 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1068 (1973); Criminal Law and Procedure,Fourth Circuit Review, 31 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 91, 101 (1974). Moreover, the court in Stoilings stated that it would consider the
future giving of the unmodified charge as grounds for reversal. 501 F.2d at 956.
In Ricon v. Garrison, 517 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1975), the Fourth Circuit heard a
habeas corpus action alleging impairment of the petitioner's sixth amendment right
to a speedy trial. While the court applied the balancing test of Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514 (1972), Rican points up an important procedural problem in applying the
standards of Barker. The lower court in Rican failed to determine the precise reason
for prosecutorial delay. When the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case, this information
was missing from the record and the court had to hypothesize plausible reasons for the
delay that would be acceptable. As the Rican case illustrates, reasons for 'delay should
be a part of the record, since in many cases, it will provide the key information with
which the court must determine if the petitioner's right to a speedy trial has been
violated. 517 F.2d at 633.
10522 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1975).
11A detainer is a legal or quasi-legal warrant or "hold order" filed against a
prisoner imprisoned in another state. By accepting the detainer, the warden having
the person in custody agrees that, rather than release the prisoner upon completion of
his sentence, the prisoner will be made available to the authorities of the requesting

1976]

FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Georgia and Louisiana.' 2 The plaintiff asserted that the Supreme
Court's decision in Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court'3 justified
his right to challenge the detainers in the district court in the state
of confinement. The plaintiff in Braden had brought his action in the
demanding state although, traditionally, the district court in the
demanding state lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action of
a plaintiff who is not "in custody" within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court." The Supreme Court circumvented the "in custody"
requirement by using an agency fiction and held that a prisoner had
a right to challenge the detainer in the district court of the demanding state.'" In contrast, by bringing his action in the district court of
the confining state, the plaintiff in Norris faced the problem of
achieving valid service of process on the prosecuting officials in the
demanding state. Without valid service of process, the court in the
confining state would lack in personam jurisdiction over the
demanding state and therefore would be unable to render a binding
judgment. The plaintiff in Norris argued that the fiction employed
by the Supreme Court in Braden was applicable regardless of where
the suit was initiated, and the district court in Norris agreed.' 6 The
Fourth Circuit reversed, stating the lower court's decision to be an
impermissible extension of the Supreme Court's holding in Braden."
The agency fiction adopted by the Supreme Court in Braden was
first developed by the Fourth Circuit.'" According to the fiction, the
confining warden acts under the "dual authority" of the confining
and demanding states, and the prisoner is deemed to be "in custody"
under authority of both the conviction and the detainer. 9 Therefore,
since the prisoner is deemed to be "in custody" of the demanding
state, the requirement for subject matter jurisdiction is satisfied and
the action can be maintained in the demanding state."0 The Supreme
state to answer charges or accusations pending in that jurisdiction. H. KERPER & J.
KERPER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE CONVICTED 474 (1974); Note, Criminal Procedure- Habeas Corpus - FederalJurisdictionExpanded, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 236 (1974).
12 522 F.2d at 1008.

1 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
" See text accompanying note 7 supra.
410 U.S. at 500.
" Norris v. Georgia, 357 F. Supp. 1200, 1205 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
" 522 F.2d at 1014.

Word v. North Carolina, 406 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1969).
406 F.2d at 355. See Comment, The CustodyRequirement and TerritorialJurisdiction in Federal Habeas Corpus: Word v. North Carolina, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 629
(1970).
" See text accompanying notes 6, 7 & 14 supra.
"

"
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Court, through the agency fiction, recognized that, in most situations, the district court in the demanding state is the most appropriate forum for an attack on the validity of a detainer.' The theory of
the district court in Norris was that since the confining state warden
acted as an agent for the demanding state by accepting the detainer,
he also acted as agent for service of process. Thus, by implication,
service of process on the confining state warden would be effective
service of process on the prosecuting officials of the demanding
state.2 2 The Fourth Circuit in Norris disagreed with this theory, basing its decision on the difficulties which could result if the district
court in the confining state attempted to adjudicate the validity of
the charge underlying the detainer. These problems included the lack
of a duty on confining state authorities to oversee the interests of the
demanding state, the absence of records and witnesses, and inconvenience to the demanding state.? Therefore, the Fourth Circuit stated
that the agency fiction employed in Braden to vest jurisdiction in the
as a basis for jurisdemanding state could not be extended in Norris
4
diction in the confining state district court.
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Norris is questionable on the basis
of the agency fiction, the history of the Braden decision, and the
actual language used in Braden. The major problem cited by the
court in Norris is that the confining state official acts as agent for
service of process for the demanding state while owing no real duty
to the demanding state.2 5 In effect, the court reasoned that the confining state official is not obligated to notify the officials of the demanding state nor to defend vigorously the interests of the demanding
state.26 However, the agency rationale is no more sound in a situation
like Braden. Although the fiction fulfills the "in custody" requirement of the habeas corpus statute, the prisoner is still not being held
under any authority of the demanding state.2 7 The detainer has no
21 410 U.S. 484, 499 n.15 (1973).

Norris v. Georgia, 357 F. Supp. 1200, 1205 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
z Norris v. Georgia, 522 F.2d at 1010-11.
21 See Wingo v. Ciccone, 507 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1974); McEachern v. Henderson,
485 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1973); Baity v. Ciccone, 379 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
These holdings do not affect a habeas corpus petition that challenges the effect being
given to the detainers by the confining state. This claim is still maintainable in the
district court of the confining state. Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224 (1970).
522 F.2d at 1011 quoting Word v. North Carolina 406 F.2d 352, 357 (4th Cir.
1969).
2' 522 F.2d at 1010-11.
2 Comment, The Custody Requirement and TerritorialJurisdictionin Federal
Habeas Corpus: Word v. North Carolina, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 629, 635 (1970).
2
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independent legal authority but is totally dependent on the effect
given it by the confining state.2 The result is that the agency fiction
employed approvingly by the Supreme Court in Bradenis susceptible
to the same infirmities whether used as in Braden to achieve the "in
2
custody" requirement or as in Norris to achieve service of process.
The Fourth Circuit in Norris also seems to ignore the conceptual
refinements in habeas corpus law which culminated in the Supreme
Court's Braden decision. 0 The Supreme Court in Ahrens v. Clark3
originally had limited habeas corpus jurisdiction for a state prisoner
to the district court in which he was confined. However, the Supreme
Court finally expanded the scope of habeas corpus relief to include
E.g., Ashley v. Washington, 394 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1968), where the court stated
that a detainer has effect outside the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing state only if
the state to which it is addressed chooses to enforce it. Id. at 126.
21 The Fourth Circuit's refusal to accept the agency fiction for purposes of securing
in personam jurisdiction will prove fatal to any case similar to Norris since there is no
valid method to secure service of process on the state issuing the detainers. At a
minimum, due process requires the nonresident party to engage in some activity within
the jurisdiction of the confining state. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945). Therefore, unless the confining state warden is accepted as the agent of the
demanding state, any attempt to secure service of process will be violative of due
process.
However, the agency fiction does not appear so radical in view of modem "long
arm" jurisdictional statutes. Recognizing the secretary of state as the agent of foreign
corporations doing business within the state, or the director of motor vehicles as the
agent of nonresident motorists involved in accidents within the state are examples of
agency fictions outlined in these statutes. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8-81.3 (Cum. Supp.
1975). The theory is that in order to enjoy the benefits of doing business within a state,
a corporation must make itself amenable to service of process within that state. Likewise, a state whose detainer is honored should be available for service of process if that
detainer is challenged since the state benefits from the assurance of access to the
prisoner upon completion of the current term of confinement.
The solution to the problems envisioned by the court in Norris is not to deny the
logical exercise of jurisdiction by the court in the confining state, but to adopt a flexible
approach to the proceedings. Upon examining the allegations of the prisoner, the court
can determine if the case should be transferred to the district court in the issuing state
for the convenience of all parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1970). In Braden, the Supreme
Court determined the demanding state to be the most practical forum in the majority
of cases. 410 U.S. at 499 n.15. The district court in the confining state must evaluate
each case to decide which forum is best equipped to handle petitioner's claim. See text
accompanying notes 35-39 infra.
1 On the historical development and expansion of federal habeas corpus, see
Note, Developments in the Law - Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1038
(1970); corresponding background material on detainers may be found in Jacob &
Sharma, Justice After Trial: Prisoners' Need for Legal Services in the Criminal Correctional Process, 18 KAN. L. Rav. 493 (1970).
31335 U.S. 188 (1948). See text accompanying notes 6, 7, 14 & 20 supra.
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attack on potential restraints such as detainers32 To alleviate the
inherent inequities of a prisoner confined in one state attempting to
attack pending charges or a conviction in another state, the Supreme
Court adopted the agency fiction so that the district court in the
demanding state would have jurisdiction.33 With this decision, the
Supreme Court expanded the territorial limitation of Ahrens, but did
not attempt to divest the district court in the confining state of its
traditional jurisdiction. 4 Moreover, the Court expressly held that
concurrent jurisdiction existed between the confining district and the
demanding district.3 The dissent in Norris recognizes this fact and
points out that nothing has transpired to restrict a district court's
traditional exercise of habeas corpus jurisdiction over a prisoner confined within its district.36 In addition, the Court in Braden stated that
in considering which district was the proper forum, it was actually
dealing with a venue rather than a jurisdictional problem .3 Under the
theory of "forum non conveniens," the 3 8action could therefore be
transferred to the most convenient forum.
The Fourth Circuit in Norris did not discuss concepts of convenience. The district court order was reversed on the basis of a lack of
Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
3 Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
Id. at 500.
Near the end of its opinion in Braden, the Court added:
Nothing in this opinion should be taken to preclude the exercise of
concurrent habeas corpus jurisdiction over the petitioner's claim by a
federal district court in the district of confinement. But as we have
made clear above, that forum will not in the ordinary case prove as
convenient as the district court in the State which has lodged the
detainer. Where a prisoner brings an action in the district of confinement attacking a detainer lodged by another State, the court can, of
course, transfer the suit to a more convenient forum. 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a).
410 U.S. at 499 n.15. See Comment, Federal Jurisdiction - Habeas Corpus 40
BROOKLYN L. REV. 475 (1973); Note, Criminal Law and Procedure- Habeas Corpus
- TerritorialJurisdiction of FederalDistrict Courts, 41 TENN. L. REv. 167 (1973);
Comment, Criminal Procedure:Habeas Corpus - FederalDistrict Court Jurisdiction,
13 WASHBURN L. J. 134 (1974); Comment, Criminal Procedure - Habeas CorpusFederal Jurisdiction Expanded, 76 W. VA. L. REv. 236 (1974).
3, 522 F.2d at 1015 (Winter, J., dissenting).
" 410 U.S. at 500. Accord, United States ex. rel. Meadows v. New York, 426 F.2d
1176 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 941 (1971).
28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1970). This venue statute allows either of the parties or the
court to move for a change in venue. Since the court is granted discretion, it is relatively simple to transfer actions between district courts of the confining and demanding states.
3
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jurisdiction, not the impropriety of the forum. By divesting the confining state district court of jurisdiction, the Fourth Circuit has established a strict jurisdictional rule requiring that a prisoner challenge the validity of a detainer in the issuing state even though it may
not be the most convenient forum. 9 Thus, the court's holding in
Norris denies the prisoner total relief in any one forum and forces him
to bring multiple suits in different jurisdictions."0 Finally, the Norris
decision contracts the jurisdiction of the confining state district court
rather than finding inappropriate venue, thereby effectively destroying the situs flexibility envisioned by the Supreme Court in Braden.
2.

Necessity for a Presentence Report

Another recent Fourth Circuit case dealt with procedure which
might affect the length and nature of a present restraint. In United
States v. Sanderlin,4" the defendant requested that a presentence
2
report be prepared for him after his first trial ended in a mistrial.1
Because of an apparent oversight by the probation office, the report
was not prepared. The trial judge held that since the defendant had
not complied with a local court rule in the timing of his request,43 the
court would not delay sentencing until the report could be prepared.
In reversing the lower court, the Fourth Circuit held that the failure
to honor the defendant's request, coupled with the mechanical application of the local rule, amounted to an abuse of discretion by the
trial court."
Rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure45 gives the
Although the demanding state is normally the most convenient forum, this is
not invariably true. For instance, if the complaint raises only legal issues challenging
the validity of the detainer, the district court in the confining state would probably
be preferable. The court in the confining state could determine whether the prisoner's
legal position had merit, and handle the petition accordingly. The practical
considerations normally favoring the district court in the demanding state would be

irrelevant. See D.

WEXIoER. THE LAw OF DETAINERS

115 (1973); See note 29 supra.

0 As Judge Winter's dissent in Norris points out, the prisoner would have to
litigate the effect of the detainer in North Carolina and then initiate actions in Georgia
and Lousiana to challenge the validity of the detainers. 522 F.2d at 1015, 1016 (Winter,
J., dissenting).
Civ. No. 74-1664 (4th Cir. June 9, 1975).
42 Id. at 6.
Rule VI(f) of Appendix B of the Local Rules of Practice for the District Court
of the Eastern District of Virginia.
1 Civ. No. 74-1664 at 6.
45 FED. R. CouM. P. 32 (c)(1). Rule 32(c) provides that the probation office of the
court will complete a presentence investigation and report unless the court directs it
not to do so.
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trial court discretion to decide whether to use a presentence report.
While traditionally the district courts have been given a great deal
of latitude in deciding whether to use a presentence report," both
commentators and professional groups have urged its use as a necessary tool for individualized sentencing." The Fourth Circuit's decision in Sanderlin, characterizing the action of the trial court as an
abuse of discretion, is illustrative of recent judicial attempts to compel the use of presentence reports." In addition, Sanderlin is consistent with the new amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure requiring the trial judge to state in the record his reasons
for not utilizing a presentence report." While valid reasons for not
using a presentence report will continue to exist,"' the Fourth Circuit
in Sanderlin implements the intent of the new Federal Rules.
46 E.g., United States v. Heng Awkak Roman, 484 F.2d 1271 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1973); United States v. Warren, 453 F.2d 738 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 944 (1972); United States v. Kane, 450 F.2d 77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 934 (1971).
"7The American Bar Association proposes that a presentence report be prepared
in every criminal case and made mandatory in all cases unless the court decides
otherwise where the maximum sentence is in excess of one year. A.B.A. STANDARDS,
PROBATION § 2.1 (1968). The National Council on Crime and Delinquency would have
a mandatory presentence report for every case in which the sentence could exceed six
months or the judge is considering probation. MODEL SENTENCING ACT § 2 (1972). In
his recent book, Judge Frankel concludes that:
[W]hatever its defects, the presentence investigation is indispensable in any sentencing scheme that does not treat the infinite varieties
of people as entirely fungible. This means . . . that . . . [district
judges] could not pretend at all to any measure of sense in sentencing
without the basic presentence investigation.

M.

FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES

35 (1973). See also Lehrich, The Use and Disclosure

of PresentenceReports, 47 F.R.D. 225 (1969); Katkin, PresentenceReports: An Analysis of Uses, Limitations and Civil Liberties Issues, 55 MINN. L. REV. 15 (1970); Note,
The Presentence Report: An Empirical Study of its Use in the Federal Criminal
Process, 58 GEO. L.J. 451 (1970).
" See United States v. Frazier, 479 F.2d 983 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Manuella, 478 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1973). The Second Circuit held that it was error to
dispense with the presentence report even when the trial judge expressed unusual delay
as his reason. 479 F.2d 983 at 986-87.

11FEDERAL

RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AMENDMENTS

ACT

OF

1975, Pub. L. No.

94-64 (Rule 32(c)), 89 Stat. 370. These new amendments became effective December
1, 1975. The House Report on the amendments makes clear that the presentence report
should be routinely used unless the judge believes there are substantial reasons not to
use it. In that case, he should clearly state those reasons in the record so that reviewing
courts will be better able to determine if the defendant has been prejudiced. H.R. REP.
No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Seass. 33 (1975), reprinted at 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM.
NEWS

1389.

1 The Second Circuit recently heard a case which presented excellent reasons for
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H. Federal Jurisdiction
1. Federal Court Abstention in Actions for Declaratory Relief
In Age of Majority Educational Corp. v. Preller,51the Fourth Circuit remanded to the district court for further consideration in view
of the recent Supreme Court pronouncements on federal abstention. 2
53 the Supreme
In Younger v. Harris,
Court gave form to the abstennot requiring a presentence report. The defendants had never been in the United States
prior to their arrests for drug trafficking and only claimed Singapore and Hong Kong
as their specific prior addresses. In this case, the investigation of the foreign defendants' backgrounds necessary for a presentence report was an impossible task for the
probation office. Therefore, the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's dispensing
wih the presentence report. United States v. Heng Awkak Roman, 484 F.2d 1271 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1973).
5 512 F.2d 1241 (4th Cir. 1975).
Any citizen of the United States can challenge the constitutionality of actions
by state officials. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). For years the federal courts
have attempted to strike a balance between a state's interest in exercising its powers
free from interference, and the federal government's desire to protect constitutional
rights. In response to these competing interests, the federal courts have evolved a
doctrine of abstaining from interference in state proceedings under certain limited
conditions. See Field, Abstention in ConstitutionalCases: The Scope of the Pullman
Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071, 1074-76 (1974).
The federal abstention doctrine, as embodied by Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), held that a plaintiff must show irreparable injury before comity would allow a
federal court to interfere with pending state criminal prosecutions either by injunction
or declaratory judgment. Id. at 53, 54. The considerations for abstention involve a
balancing of the federal court's interest in adjudicating federal claims and the state
court's interest in maintaining the orderly administration of its laws. See Note, Implications of the Younger cases for the Availability of Federal Equitable Relief When No
State Prosecutionis Pending, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 874 (1972); Note, FederalDeclaratory
Relief and the Non-Pending State Criminal Suit, 34 MD. L. REv. 87 (1974). In 1974
the Supreme Court modified the abstention principles of Younger to the extent that if
the state prosecution was not pending at the time of initiation of the federal suit, then
equitable principles would not preclude a declaratory judgment. Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452 (1974). See Field, supra.
In all of the six cases decided in 1971 dealing with federal abstention, the federal
court plaintiff had been indicted in state court at the time the federal complaint was
filed. Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971);
Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Samuels
v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). However, the
Court failed to delineate precisely what it considered to be a "pending" state prosecution. This silent handling of the issue by the Supreme Court led most lower courts to
interpret "pending", in view of the facts in Younger, as commencing with the time of
filing the complaint in federal court. Jones v. Wade, 479 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1973);
Armour & Co. v. Ball, 468 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 981 (1973).
0 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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tion doctrine by holding that only when a plaintiff demonstrates the
immediate possibility of irreparable injury and exceptional circumstances such as bad faith by the state prosecutors can a federal court
interfere in pending state proceedings. 4 In Steffel v. Thompson,5 the
Supreme Court broadened the abstention principles by holding that
if the plaintiff files a federal action for declaratory relief prior to the
initiation of state proceedings he need not make the stringent showing required by Younger in order for his federal suit to proceed. "6 The
district court opinion in Age of Majority, rendered prior to the Supreme Court holding in Steffel, stated that the principles of Younger
applied to bar relief. 7 The Fourth Circuit reversed that part of the
lower court decision dealing with the request for declaratory relief
and remanded for further consideration in light of the Steffel decision.18
The Fourth Circuit, and other courts, interpreted Steffel as delineating a sharp line between a pending and a non-pending suit."9 If the
federal suit is filed prior to the initiation of state criminal proceedings, Steffel applies and the suit for declaratory relief is permitted. 0
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit found that since no state criminal
charges had been filed against the plaintiff at the time the federal suit
was filed, Younger did not apply to bar relief.'
The concurring opinion suggested a novel approach to the issue
of when federal abstention is appropriate. 2 Relying on Allee v.
Medrano,63 Judge Widener argued that because the plaintiffs knew
state. charges were imminent when they filed their federal action, and
since the state prosecutions were actually instituted shortly thereafter, the principles of comity in Younger might apply. 4 The Supreme Court in Allee implied that Younger could have vitality past
the time the federal suit is filed if state proceedings are initiated at
any time prior to the federal district court decision.65 Thus, a federal
declaratory decision is not guaranteed merely by filing a suit before
s Id. at 52.
5 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
5'Id. at 472.
'7

Modem Social Educ., Inc. v. Preller, 353 F. Supp. 173 (D. Md. 1973).
Age of Majority Educ. Corp. v. Preller, 512 F.2d 1241, 1242 (1975).

' See note 116 supra.
6o415 U.S. at 472.
" 512 F.2d at 1243.
62 Id. at 1246.
416 U.S. 802 (1974).

"

512 F.2d at 1247.
Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 817 (1974).
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the state prosecution has commenced. 6 This interpretation was
pressed by Judge Widener because 6of7 the "race to the courthouse"
resulting from the majority decision.
The problem with a "race to the courthouse" test is twofold. First,
it ignores the principles of federal-state comity which guided the
Supreme Court in Younger. The plaintiff can frustrate the state's
administration of its criminal laws by filing his declaratory judgment
action prior to the institution of the state proceedings." Second, the
test places the state in a difficult equal protection position since two
of its citizens may participate in identical conduct and only one be
prosecuted." The citizen who wins the "race to the courthouse" is
shielded from state prosecution by his federal declaratory action
while a citizen who loses the "race" faces criminal charges.76 Recognizing these problems, the Supreme Court recently clarified the parameters of its holdings in Younger and Steffel in such a way that the
Fourth Circuit again may be forced to review its decision in Age of
7
Majority. 1
In Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc. ,72 the plaintiffs filed their federal
action prior to any state proceedings and alleged that a local ordinance proscribing topless dancing was unconstitutionally overbroad.7 3 Immediately thereafter, one of the plaintiffs resumed the
unlawful activity and was subsequently prosecuted.74 The Supreme
Judge Widener relied on language from Allee:
Although both parties here have assumed the relevance of Younger,
we have been unable to find any precise indication in the District
Court opinion or in the record that there were pending prosecutions
at the time of the District Court decision.
- 512 F.2d 1246 quoting 416 U.S. at 817 (emphasis added).
87 512 F.2d at 1246. The problems inherent in dealing with the strict line between
pending and non-pending actions creating the "race to the courthouse" have not gone
unnoticed. See Note, FederalRelief Against Threatened State Prosecutions:The Implicationsof Younger, Lake Carriers and Roe, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 965, 986 (1973); Note,
Steffel v. Thompson: Federal DeclaratoryRelief and the State Criminal Process - A
Compromise of Comity and Primacy, 9 U.S.F.L. REv. 87, 111 (1974).
" 512 F.2d at 1247. See Note, Federal DeclaratoryRelief and the Non-Pending
State Criminal Suit, 34 MD. L. REv. 87, 118-21 (1974).
" See Note, Steffel v. Thompson: FederalDeclaratoryRelief and the State Criminal Process- A Compromise of Comity and Primacy, 9 U.S.F.L. REv. 87, 110-12 (1974).
70 Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 364 F. Supp. 478, 481-82 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). See note
67 supra.
1' Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 2561 (1975); Hicks v. Miranda, 95 S. Ct.
2281 (1975).
72 95 S. Ct. 2561 (1975).
13Id. at 2564.
74Id.
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Court stated that although the plaintiffs had filed their actions together, each plaintiff's claim would be considered individually.7 "
Therefore, as to the plaintiff who had continued the outlawed conduct, the principles of Younger would bar relief because the "federal
litigation was in an embryonic state and no contested matter had
been decided.""6 As to the other plaintiffs, the Court held that since
no state prosecutions were pending, the principles of Steffel would
apply and the federal suit could proceed." Thus, in Salem Inn, the
Supreme Court distinguished" the federal court plaintiff who, following a threat of prosecution ceases his conduct, as in Steffel, from the
federal court plaintiff who persists in his conduct despite the threat
79
of prosecution, as in Salem Inn and Age of Majority.
The Court
made this distinction in an attempt to prevent a federal court plaintiff from using declaratory proceedings as an improper shield for illegal activity.
The Fourth Circuit should re-examine its position in Age of
Majority in view of the recent statements by the Supreme Court
concerning the applicability of Younger beyond the time of filing of
the federal action. The plaintiff in Age of Majority continued his
operation of adult education clubs after filing the federal action, and
state prosecutions were initiated shortly thereafter." Since the sequence of events is identical to that in Salem Inn, upon reconsideration,
the Fourth Circuit might find that the district court was correct in
holding that the principles of Younger would preclude relief.
" Id. at 2566.
" Id. While the Supreme Court's holding in Hicks v. Miranda, 95 S. Ct. 2281
(1975) was the same as in Salem Inn, there was a significant dissent in Hicks:
There is . . .something unseemly about having the applicability of
the Younger doctrine turn solely on the outcome of a race to the
courthouse. The rule the Court adopts today, however, does not eliminate that race; it merely permits the State to leave the mark later,
run a shorter course, and arrive first at the finish line.
95 S. Ct. 2281, 2294 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
77Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 2561, 2567 (1975).
7"This distinction was first put forward by Justice Rehnquist in his concurring
opinion in Steffel. 415 U.S. 452, 479-80 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
"' 95 S. Ct. at 2566.
" While the Supreme Court's holdings in Salem Inn and Hicks do not go as far
as the language relied on by Judge Widener in his concurring opinion in Age of
Majority, the import is the same - to create a flexible system in which the principles
of Younger can, in appropriate circumstances, extend past the filing of the federal
action. See note 66 supra.
11 512 F.2d at 1246.
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Scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1952

There are certain limited areas in which the federal courts have
original jurisdiction to prosecute substantive crimes.82 In United
States v. LeFaivre,83 the Fourth Circuit attempted to define the scope
of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (The Travel Act). 4 Relying on two of its previous
decisions, 5 the court in LeFaivre held that the defendant's act of
cashing fourteen out-of-state checks and the consequent use of interstate banking facilities were sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction
under § 1952.
The Fourth Circuit has thus come to a different conclusion than
the Second86 and Seventh8 7 Circuits in interpreting the Supreme
Court holding in Rewis v. United States.8 In Rewis, the Supreme
Court held that gambling operators in one state could not be prosecuted under the Travel Act because the only interstate activity involved was customer travel from another state.8 The Rewis decision
emphasized the considerations of comity in its restrictive interpreta11Since the federal government does not have a general "police power", the federal crime must be tied to one of the delegated powers through the "necessary and
proper" clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 18. The jurisdictional requirements in these
limited areas are normally made an element of the offense. E. g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(1970) (use of the mails to defraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1312 (1970) (interstate transportation
of stolen vehicles).
- 507 F.2d 1288 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975).
18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970).
See United States v. Salisbury, 430 F.2d 1045 (4th Cir. 1970) (cashing of outof-state checks with a local druggist held sufficient interstate activity to support a
conviction under the Travel Act); United States v. Wechsler, 392 F.2d 344 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 932 (1968) (deposit of an out-of-state check received as a bribe
held sufficient to support federal jurisdiction.)
U Decisions in the Second Circuit which exemplify the interstate activity required
are: United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir.), reh. denied, 486 F.2d 683 (1973)
(per curiam) (phone call from government agent to defendant insufficient); United
States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1973) (defendant's frequent interstate travel
substantial and therefore sufficient under the Travel Act).
"7Decisions in the Seventh Circuit which exemplify the interstate activity required are: United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1974) (deposit of out-of-state check in local bank insufficient); United States v. Lee,
448 F.2d 604 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971) (frequent interstate travel by
two employees sufficient); United States v. McCormick, 442 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1971)
(an advertisement placed in a local paper that reached an incidental number of outof-state subscribers was insufficient interstate activity); United States v. Altobella,
442 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1971) (out-of-state check written and cashed by extortion victim
was insufficient use of interstate facilities to invoke the Travel Act).
- 401 U.S. 808 (1971).
"Id. at 811.
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tion of the statute. 0 The Seventh and Second Circuits accordingly
have rendered restrictive interpretations of the Travel Act requiring
substantial and integral involvement of interstate facilities, or at the
minimum, more than incidental involvement."
In LeFaivre, the defendant ran a large scale gambling operation
in which he cashed approximately $1,500,000 in negotiable instruments over a three year period. The cashing of fourteen out-of-state
checks during this period was minor compared to the volume of business transacted." Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit found the activity
sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court in
Rewis explained that jurisdiction under the Travel Act cannot be
expanded to include passive, unforeseen use of interstate facilities.
However, the Court left open the question of precisely how significant
the use made of interstate facilities by a defendant has to be before
his activity becomes a federal offense under the Travel Act.
In attempting to define this ambiguity, the Fourth Circuit in
LeFaivre and the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Isaacs94 reached
different conclusions. Since these cases cannot be limited to their
facts, the inevitable conflict is one of substance rather than semantics. 5 The Seventh Circuit in Isaacs rejected" the Fourth Circuit
decisions that minor use of interstate banking facilities was sufficient
to invoke federal jurisdiction,97 and held that the interstate activity
must be more substantial and integral to the criminal activity." The
court in Isaacs also rejected the idea that jurisdiction could be found
o The Supreme Court stated that if the Travel Act was interpreted in such an
expansive manner, it would "alter sensitive federal-state relationships. . . overextend
limited federal police resources. . . and . . . transform relatively minor state offenses
into federal felonies." 401 U.S. at 812.
See notes 86 & 87 supra.
92 507 F.2d at 1290.
Id. at 1296.
, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974).
See text infra. By contrast, the Second Circuit decision in United States v.
Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973), can be limited to its facts. The court in Archer
held that the Travel Act could not be invoked when the total interstate activity is
contrived by the government in order to provide the necessary jurisdictional basis. 486
F.2d at 672. In denying a rehearing, the Archer court stated that although the
government expressed concern over the restrictive jurisdictional precedent which
might be set by Archer, the decision held only that federal jurisdiction cannot be
triggered when the jurisdictional element is totally contrived by government agents.
486 F.2d at 685-86. See also Note, Governmental Lawbreakingand ContrivedJurisdiction Under the Travel Act: United States v. Archer, 6 CONN. L. REv. 577 (1974).
" 493 F.2d at 1149.
9 See note 85 supra.
" 493 F.2d at 1149.
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where persons other than the defendants engaged in the interstate
activity.0 The Fourth Circuit in LeFaivre made a similar review of
prior Seventh Circuit decisions which required more than incidental
interstate involvement, 00 but refused to follow them unless the decisions could be limited to their facts.' The language of § 1952 supports the Fourth Circuit position since it covers anyone who either
travels in interstate commerce or who uses any facility of interstate
commerce." 2 The defendant in LeFaivre, by cashing the out-of-state
checks, purposely utilized a facility of interstate commerce to further
the criminal activity. Since Congress has not qualified the plain language of § 1952, the Fourth Circuit's literal interpretation of the
statute is justified." 3
The other major issue'" in LeFaivre concerned the intent necessary to uphold a conviction for conspiracy to violate the Travel Act. 5
Conspiracy is normally thought of as a "specific intent" crime,0 0 but
at the time LeFaivre was decided there was considerable conflict
among the circuits as to whether specific intent to activate the federal
jurisdictional element of the crime was necessary. 07
The Fourth Circuit held that specific intent to violate the federal
jurisdictional element was not required to convict a defendant of
conspiracy under the Travel Act.' This interpretation was confirmed
three months later when the Supreme Court decided, on identical
grounds, that specific intent to use or specific knowledge of the fed9 Id. at 1148. The Supreme Court in Rewis specifically did not decide whether
active use of interstate facilities or solicitation of interstate clientele by defendants

would place the defendants within the scope of the Travel Act. 401 U.S. at 813-14. See
text accompanying notes 88-90 supra.

110See note 85 supra.
102507 F.2d at 1294.
202

18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (1970).

507 F.2d at 1296.
As an alternative theory, the defendants in Le Faivre argued that whether the

202
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use of interstate facilities was sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction was a question

of fact for the jury. The Fourth Circuit disagreed and held that it was a question of
law. 507 F.2d at 1297. This creates a conflict with the Fifth Circuit which has held that
a defendant seeking to avoid a federal charge under the Travel Act was entitled to
attempt to convince a jury that jurisdiction did not exist. United States v. Presley,
478 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1973).
"o
206

507 F.2d at 1297.
W. LAFAvE
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465 (1972).

Cases which have held that specific intent is a necessary element: United

207

States v. Alsondo, 486 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1973); Nassif v. United States, 370 F.2d 147

(8th Cir. 1966). One case has held that intent is not a necessary element for conviction:
United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971).

507 F.2d at 1299.

201

